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> Context • The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food 
crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what 
the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. 
> Problem • The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems be-
cause they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing 
second-order science in domains where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. 
> Method • We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a 
number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of 
science. > Results • The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five prin-
ciples. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 
2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves 
as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. > Implications • The perspectivist insights 
of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular 
methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic 
processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least 
to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. > Constructivist content • Our perspectivist approach to science is 
based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luh-
mann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll 
and Peirce. > Key words • Perspectivism, semiotics, complex phenomena, social systems theory, differentiation of sci-
ence, perspectival knowledge asymmetries.
“Perspective is one of the component parts 
of reality. Far from being a disturbance of its 
fabric, it is its organizing element.” 
(Ortega y Gasset 1961: 90)
“…a scientific perspectivism does not degenerate 
into a silly relativism.” (Giere 2006a: 13)
Introduction
« 1 » The science of sustainable agricul-
ture is an example of a science that does not 
have its own scientific perspective. It de-
pends on interdisciplinary collaboration be-
tween many different specialized disciplines 
such as plant physiology, organic chemistry, 
soil physics, environmental science, ecology, 
engineering, statistics, business economics, 
and sociology; and it must always be pre-
pared to include new perspectives (recently, 
e.g., climate change, marketing, and social 
systems) due to the influence of a large va-
riety of stakeholders and the structural and 
semantic developments within agriculture, 
food, the environment, and society at large.
« 2 » The problems that are most in 
need of interdisciplinary cooperation are 
“wicked problems” such as food crises, cli-
mate change mitigation, and other resilience 
and sustainability problems (Klein 2004). 
Wicked problems are complex problems 
where there is disagreement on what the 
problem actually is, there are different inter-
ests and different perspectives involved that 
frame the problem differently, and proposed 
solutions often contradict each other (Rittel 
& Webber 1973).
« 3 » Bryan Norton emphasizes that 
with respect to wicked problems we face an 
analytic void:
“ For those frustrated with the lack of progress in 
many areas of environmental protection, Rittel & 
Webber’s work suggested a powerful explanatory 
hypothesis: Complex environmental problems 
cannot be comprehended within any of the ac-
cepted disciplinary models available in the acad-
emy or in discourses on public interest and policy. 
This failure is not a matter of inadequate practice, 
but a matter of principle.” (Norton 2012: 449)
« 4 » This means that the wicked prob-
lems of today both require and challenge 
interdisciplinarity. “The real-world research 
problems that scientists address rarely arise 
within orderly disciplinary categories, and 
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neither do their solutions” (Palmer 2001: 
vii). There is a need for unsimple truths 
(Mitchell 2009). But the conventional ideas 
and methods of interdisciplinary research 
fall short in the case of wicked problems. It 
is well-known that there are fundamental 
problems of communicating across disci-
plines and carrying out cross-disciplinary1 
research in practice (e.g., Miller et al. 2008; 
Bracken & oughton 2006; Harrison, Mas-
sey & Richards 2008; Noe, alrøe & Langvad 
2008; Pennington 2008). The more ambi-
tious the collaboration is, in terms of using 
and integrating very different scientific per-
spectives in solving real, complex problems, 
the more difficult the task.
« 5 » Interdisciplinary studies have gen-
erally been developed as complementary to 
the development of specialized disciplines, 
based on the need to understand complex 
issues, answer complex questions and solve 
complex problems (e.g., Klein 1996, 2004; 
Moran 2010; Repko 2012). But the epis-
temological aspects are rarely considered 
within the field where we might expect it, 
the philosophy of science, though philoso-
phers of science have recently begun to fo-
cus more on the interaction of epistemic and 
social practices (Krishnan 2009: 19).
« 6 » We argue that the existing ap-
proaches to cross-disciplinary research are 
problematic because they remain first-order. 
This can be in the form of independent and 
uncoordinated research perspectives on a 
given problem, a patchwork of coordinated 
but still separate research perspectives, a 
synthesis through the lens of a hegemonic 
discipline (such as, often, economics), or a 
synthesis based on a new integrated disci-
pline (such as first-order system theories). 
accordingly, we work to overcome the 
challenge to interdisciplinary science and 
the conundrum of doing cross-disciplinary 
research by way of a thorough perspectivist 
understanding of science that operates with 
1 | We use “cross-disciplinary” as a generic 
term to encompass the various forms of multi-, 
inter- and transdisciplinary cooperation between 
scientific disciplines on a common issue. often 
“interdisciplinary” is used as the general term, 
but this can be confusing since interdisciplinary is 
also one of the different forms of interdisciplinar-
ity (see Klein 2010 for a taxonomy of interdisci-
plinarity).
both first-order and second-order observa-
tion. our aims in this paper are to present 
a second-order polyocular framework for 
doing interdisciplinary research on wicked 
problems, and to describe workable meth-
ods and research designs for this second-
order science.
« 7 » The proposed methodologies are 
empirically grounded in our participation 
in a range of large interdisciplinary research 
projects. The paper is based on fifteen years 
of research and a number of earlier publi-
cations that propose perspectivist analyses 
and second-order research methodologies 
in the domain of agriculture, food and en-
vironment.
« 8 » In the following, we first present 
the perspectivist view of science and lay out 
the principles of polyocular research. Then 
we illustrate and discuss the implications 
of the polyocular framework for cross-dis-
ciplinary research, and for practice. Finally, 
we discuss future directions and sum up our 
conclusions.
the perspectivist view 
of science
« 9 » Perspectivism has had a long but 
marginal presence in philosophy, with roots 
in Kant and Nietzsche (e.g., Palmquist 1993; 
anderson 1998; Hales & Welshon 2000). 
In a perspectivist view, science is observer-
dependent to the core, and we see a growing 
recognition in science studies that all scien-
tific knowledge is perspectival; i.e., that the 
context established by a scientific discipline 
is decisive for the kind of observations that 
can be made by that discipline. This devel-
opment is connected to the development of 
radical constructivism, which suggests that 
we, including science, actively construct our 
world and that deeper insights in the knowl-
edge constructions of science can be gained 
from cognitive sciences (Riegler 2001).
« 10 » The perspectivist view of science 
that we present here is a radicalization of the 
existing perspectivist, cognitive approach to 
science by way of a Luhmannian social sys-
tems approach to science as a communica-
tive system (alrøe 2000; alrøe & Noe 2011).
« 11 » The cognitive understanding of 
science, where the focus is on scientific mod-
els and representation rather than theories 
and truth, has been growing and develop-
ing in philosophy of science over the last few 
decades (e.g., Giere 1988; Cartwright 1999; 
Fraassen 2008), and it has recently been 
developed into an explicitly perspectival 
philosophy of science, labelled “scientific 
perspectivism,” by Ronald Giere (2006a). 
This implies that all scientific knowledge is 
perspectival, given that scientific knowledge 
is created in scientific perspectives, and that 
scientific representations and measurement 
outcomes are perspectival (Fraassen 2008: 
8, 183). With regard to interdisciplinary sci-
ence, the cognitive perspectivist approach 
has led to a pluralist view of science, a “per-
spectival pluralism” (Giere 2006b), where 
different perspectives highlight different as-
pects while ignoring others (Giere 1999: 28), 
and maintaining a plurality of perspectives 
promotes scientific progress (Longino 2006):
“ a thorough-going disciplinary pluralism […] 
suggests that sometimes the perspectives don’t fit 
nicely together on the same plane: they overlap or 
conflict or cannot both be held at the same time, 
and yet you need both of them.” (Kellert 2006: 
225)
The perspectivist view of science implies 
that there are many scientific truths about 
any complex problem, and the question is 
not how to select the correct one, but how 
to appreciate and use the “nonunifiable plu-
rality of partial knowledges” (Longino 2006: 
127). But no real perspectivist methodol-
ogy has so far been developed to handle the 
challenge of interdisciplinary science in this 
line of work.
« 12 » In the social systems approach to 
science, the specialization of disciplines is 
studied on the basis of an evolutionary under-
standing of science as a communicative social 
system that undergoes specialization through 
functional differentiation (Luhmann 1990; 
stichweh 1992). “The sciences are diverg-
ing and there is no reason to think that any 
kind of convergence will ever occur” (suppes 
1978: 6). In this scenario there is no hope of 
Habermasian consensus communication and 
integration between the disciplines; special-
ized communication is basically incommen-
surable (whereas communication between 
different disciplines using our general, daily 
language is always possible, though fallible), 
and strong interdisciplinary communica-
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tion is only possible by co-creating a new, 
shared genre of discourse (Holbrook 2013). 
From this evolutionary, communicative view 
of science, the paradox of scientific expertise 
becomes evident: that the growth of scientific 
knowledge leads to a fragmentation of scien-
tific knowledge (alrøe & Noe 2011). The dif-
ferentiation and specialization of science and 
expertise results in what we call perspectival 
knowledge asymmetries: different scientific 
perspectives see complex matters differently, 
and these differences cannot, and should not, 
be merged.
« 13 » The perspectivist view of science 
that we advocate sees different research ap-
proaches (including disciplines, sub-disci-
plines, and more specific research approach-
es, as well as “schools of thought,” Kuhnian 
paradigms2, and Lakatosian research pro-
grams3) as perspectives for observing the 
world (Giere 2006a; alrøe & Noe 2011). 
different scientific perspectives are charac-
terized by different methods, instruments 
of observation and entire experimental ar-
rangements, different concepts, categories, 
and theories, and different concerns and 
questions, as well as implicit values and tacit 
embodied knowledge and practices (cf. Col-
lins 2010). all of this determines what a spe-
cific scientific perspective can observe and 
what it cannot observe.
« 14 » Thomas Kuhn’s paradigms are 
examples of scientific perspectives in our 
understanding, according to his “Postscript 
1969” to the highly influential “The struc-
ture of scientific Revolutions,” where he 
suggests the term “disciplinary matrix” as 
a more precise term for “paradigm” (Kuhn 
1996). But where Kuhn and the Kuhnian 
tradition generally have a historical, dia-
chronic focus on how paradigms may shift 
within a single scientific field (scientific rev-
olutions), we focus on the synchronic differ-
ences across disciplines and perspectives in 
line with Magoroh Maruyama (1974).
« 15 » The concept of perspective, as we 
use it, originates from investigations of sci-
ence as an observing system that is directed 
at learning (alrøe 2000; alrøe & Kristensen 
2002; alrøe & Noe 2012). It draws on the one 
hand on an analogy with organisms, focus-
ing on the characteristics of the sensory or 
2 | see “Postscript 1969” in Kuhn (1996).
3 | see Lakatos (1978: 47ff).
observational apparatus, and the interactive 
aspect of observation, such as experiments. 
In this, we build on the autopoiesis of living 
systems (Maturana & varela 1980), the field 
of embodied cognition (e.g., varela, Thomp-
son & Rosch 1991), and especially on Jakob 
von uexküll (1982), who investigated the 
different phenomenal worlds (umwelten) 
that animals have due to their different sen-
sory and cognitive apparatuses, and the later 
development of biosemiotics, of which he is 
now considered the founding father (sebeok 
2001). The connection to biosemiotics sug-
gests a theoretical grounding of the perspec-
tivist understanding of science in Peircean 
semiotics, which we will unfold in the next 
section.
« 16 » on the other hand, our concep-
tion of perspective draws on an analogy with 
autopoietic social systems, such as organiza-
tions and firms (Luhmann 1995, andersen 
2003), who observe their environment and 
themselves, based on operational closure 
and blind spots. “The blind spot of observa-
tion exists because of the fact that observa-
tion cannot see that it cannot see that which 
it cannot see” (andersen 2003: 65). Niklas 
Luhmann very clearly operates with a per-
spectivist approach (though he does not call 
it that),4 laying out the premises of observa-
tion of observation of social communica-
tive systems, following Heinz von Foerster’s 
(1981, 2003) second-order cybernetics.
« 17 » In short, a perspective is that which 
determines what an observer can observe and 
what it cannot observe. The perspectives that 
we are mainly concerned with in this article 
are scientific perspectives, and the observers 
we look at are social systems, the observing 
systems of science. observation is of course 
a key notion,5 and it is treated in more de-
tail in the next section (see Figure  1). The 
term “polyocular” has been constructed 
in analogy with binocular and monocular 
(Maruyama 1974), and here “ocular” is used 
in nearly the same sense as perspective, but 
4 | doubts have even been raised about 
whether Luhmann’s standpoint was properly con-
structivist (Riegler & scholl 2012), but his critical 
arguments are also considered a help in clarifying 
radical constructivist epistemology (scholl 2012).
5 | alrøe & Noe (2012) investigate different 
constructivist conceptions of “observation” and the 
corresponding notion of “environment” or “world.”
with a built-in social systems theoretical 
meaning in the form of the “blind spot” of 
an eye (Latin: oculus).
« 18 » a scientific perspective is thus an 
autopoietic system that is reproduced and 
refined through internal processes (alrøe 
2000), and which produces its own meth-
ods, theories and instruments for observa-
tion, and thereby also its own inputs (data).
« 19 » on the basis of this perspectiv-
ist understanding of science, we describe 
a second-order, polyocular framework for 
interdisciplinary research. The key point is 
that interdisciplinary cooperation must be 
based on an awareness and recognition of 
the interacting disciplines first and foremost 
as perspectives – not as social groups, not as 
discourses, not as “sciences working on dif-
ferent domains.”
Five principles for 
polyocular research
« 20 » The second-order, polyocular 
framework for interdisciplinary research 
can be characterized by five interrelated but 
separate principles.
Principle 1 – Observing 
observations
« 21 » The first principle is grounded in 
the perspectivist view of science, which sees 
different research approaches as perspec-
tives for observing the world (Giere 2006a; 
alrøe & Noe 2011).
« 22 » science has no access to the world 
or “that which is observed,” except through 
observations (including interactions), as we 
shall explore in Principle 2.6 all scientific 
observations belong to a scientific perspec-
tive, and the observations of a perspective 
include that perspective. The perspective 
is part of what an “observation” is. In his 
philosophy of quantum physics, Niels Bohr 
advocated that the very word phenomenon 
be applied exclusively to refer to the ob-
servations obtained under specific circum-
stances, including an account of the whole 
experimental arrangement (Bohr 1985: 27). 
6 | a more thorough analysis of constructiv-
ist approaches to the relation between world/en-
vironment and observation can be found in alrøe 
& Noe (2012).
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We advocate taking this as a general princi-
ple, based on the perspectivist view of sci-
ence, and taking complex phenomenon to 
mean a phenomenon where multiple per-
spectives are needed to give an unambigu-
ous description (sensu Bohr, see Favrholdt 
1999: xlix; alrøe & Kristensen 2002) of the 
phenomenon, and where the degree of com-
plexity depends on the number and variety 
of perspectives needed. (This definition of 
complexity is very different from e.g., ideas 
about complexity building on statistical 
complexity, such as Ladyman, Lambert & 
Wiesner 2013).
« 23 » The only access for interdiscipli-
nary science to studying a complex problem 
or complex phenomenon is through the 
(first-order) scientific perspectives that en-
ter into the study. or in other words, there is 
no all-encompassing scientific perspective. 
aspirations in science to develop a deeper 
understanding of a complex problem can 
only be realized through specialization, 
which often involves a differentiation into 
separate specialized scientific perspectives, 
with their own semantics and means of 
observation. This differentiation of science 
has happened throughout the history of sci-
ence (stichweh 1992; Weingart 2010). any 
attempt to reunite the fragmented sciences 
into a unitary science, such as the various 
systems sciences, either loses the powers of 
the specialized sciences or forms a new spe-
cialized perspective, or both.7 as autopoietic 
systems, scientific perspectives are closed to 
each other, they are each other’s environ-
ment. second-order perspectives can only 
access the findings of first-order perspec-
tives by observing them.
« 24 » It follows that the second-order 
science of interdisciplinary research must 
observe the observations of first-order per-
spectives; not the social systems as in a soci-
ology of science study, and not the “results” 
as they are often presented in a de-contextu-
alized form, but the results in a form where 
it is clear how they are constructed from 
observations through the cognitive and 
analytical tools of the scientific perspective. 
7 | This is not to say that integrating theories 
cannot be helpful and attractive, nor that integra-
tion in science is not a continuous aim (e.g., in 
the “unity of science” movement), and a some-
times very successful strategy (e.g., in molecular 
biology and nanoscience). But a recombination 
of relatively proximate fields will itself develop 
into another specialized field, such as molecular 
biology, and does not as such contradict the gen-
eral process of differentiation in science; and the 
combinations of disciplines into applied research 
centers, such as nanoscience centers, with cor-
responding journals and funding programs, are 
compatible with, and depend on, the continuous 
independent development of disciplines (Riegler 
2005; Weingart 2010).
Perspectival knowledge must always be of 
the form “seen from this or that perspective, 
such and such is the case.” only in this rich 
form can the observations enter into a poly-
ocular communication.
« 25 » In headline form, the first prin-
ciple is: second-order science of interdisci-
plinary research must draw on the observa-
tions of first-order perspectives, because:
  all observations include the observer,8 
and only perspectives can offer observa-
tions;
  research approaches should be under-
stood as perspectives, and scientific 
knowledge depends on the observing 
perspective;
  there is no holistic scientific perspective;
  first-order perspectives are the only ac-
cess to observing complex problems.
Principle 2 – A shared dynamical 
object
« 26 » What observers see depends on 
how they see it, and “the same thing” may 
therefore be seen in different ways. But how, 
then, can observers determine whether they 
are looking at the same thing? This seem-
ingly simple question is in fact a deep philo-
sophical question that requires a compre-
hensive semiotic understanding that is able 
to address how observations relate to that 
which is observed.
« 27 » Interdisciplinary research re-
quires a shared research object; this is part of 
the very definition of what interdisciplinary 
research is. But different scientific perspec-
tives have different names and specialized 
concepts for the objects they observe; this is 
part of what makes them a specialized per-
spective. This means that we cannot be sure 
that we look at the same thing, even though 
we think we do. a farm from an economic 
perspective (a “farm enterprise”) is a quite 
different entity from a farm from a socio-
logical or an environmental perspective. a 
cow from an accounting perspective is quite 
different from a cow from a veterinary or a 
landscape conservation perspective. In a per-
spectivist, semiotic understanding, we can 
analyze this in the form of signs (Figure 1). 
8 | By “all observations include the observer” 
we mean that every observation is made from 
somewhere, from a certain perspective (alrøe & 
Kristensen 2002).
Immediate objectInterpretant
Sign
Dairy cow
A cow that
produces milk
for an income
Dynamical object
Animal with a surplus
of possible functions
Delimitation of the
observing system
Causal
interaction
Semiotic
reference
Figure 1 • The semiotic model of a scientific perspective, with three key conditions for observa-
tion (Alrøe & Noe 2011: 157). The dotted circle with arrows symbolizes that the perspective is an 
autopoietic social system, and the eye symbol indicates that it is also an observing system.
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according to Peirce a sign, or representa-
men, is something that stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity.
“ a sign therefore has a triadic relation to its ob-
ject and to its Interpretant. But it is necessary to 
distinguish the Immediate object, or the object 
as the sign represents it, from the dynamical ob-
ject, or really efficient but not immediately pres-
ent object.” (Peirce 1998: 482, CP: 8.343)
« 28 » Peirce’s distinction between the 
dynamical and the immediate object to some 
degree corresponds to Kant’s distinction be-
tween phenomena, things-for-us, and nou-
mena – things-in-themselves (alrøe & Noe 
2011, 2012). some say they differ in that the 
Kantian ding an sich is unknowable as it is 
in itself, whereas the Peircean thing in itself, 
the dynamical object, is essentially repre-
sentable and knowable as a limiting case,9 
as truth is a limiting case for Peirce. But in 
order to approach the dynamical object, we 
have to acquire what Peirce calls collateral 
experience of the supposed same dynamical 
object (Hardwick & Cook 1977: 83).
« 29 » There is no position from where 
we can observe the dynamical object as it 
is in itself. (This is of course very different 
from a traditional realist conception, which 
takes the thing in itself as the immediately 
present object.)10 Every perspective adds to 
the number of immediate objects that refer 
to, point at, or hint at the dynamical object. 
The immediate objects all refer to a dynami-
cal object, but none of them are the same as 
the dynamical object in itself. What rescues 
the prospects for interdisciplinary research 
is that dynamical objects “strike back” in our 
interaction with them, and that this causal 
interaction is part of what makes up the 
observations of scientific perspectives (Fig-
ure 1). This relational nature of observation 
is also what enables scientific perspectives to 
make changes in the world that correspond 
9 | see Joseph Ransdell’s “on the use and 
abuse of the immediate/dynamical object distinc-
tion.” Retrieved from http://www.cspeirce.com/
menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm 
on 5 May 2014.
10 | see also Winfried Nöth (2011) on the 
relation between the Peircean semiotic idea that 
representation is always incomplete and radical 
constructivism.
to their specialized observations. However, 
the existence of a shared dynamical object 
can never be presumed, but must be estab-
lished and synchronized in each case.
« 30 » For cross-disciplinary research 
efforts, the questions of a shared dynamical 
research object and collateral experience are 
particularly difficult because they concern 
complex phenomena; that is, phenomena 
that can only be established by the collabor-
ative effort of multiple specialized perspec-
tives, and which refer to complex dynamical 
objects.
« 31 » In headline form, the second 
principle is: second-order science of inter-
disciplinary research must address a shared 
dynamical object (sensu Peirce), because:
  interdisciplinary research requires a 
shared research object;
  there is no position from where we can 
observe the “thing-in-itself ”;
  each perspective has its own immediate 
object.
Principle 3 – A shared problem
« 32 » The second principle focused on 
the cognitive problem for interdisciplin-
ary research to ensure that the involved 
perspectives observe the same thing. But 
why bother? Generally, scientific efforts are 
driven by either internal or external ques-
tions, or some combination thereof. Inter-
nal questions rarely motivate interdisciplin-
ary cooperation; interdisciplinary research 
is mostly motivated by external questions, 
often formulated as “problems” for society 
or certain groups in society. Therefore it is 
a separate requirement for interdisciplin-
ary research to establish a shared problem. 
Whereas having a shared dynamical object 
is the enabling factor for interdisciplinary 
research, having a shared problem is the 
motivating factor that calls for cooperative 
work (see also the section “Phases of poly-
ocular research”).
« 33 » an important societal problem is 
an irritation, like an itch, a pain, or a gen-
eral discomfort is an irritation for a person; 
this societal irritation we call a dynamical 
problem in analogy to the dynamical object 
and dynamical interpretant of Peirce. The 
problem is felt in different ways by different 
stakeholders, who occupy different perspec-
tives, and is not necessarily perceived as one 
and the same problem. science is needed 
to establish these perceived problems as a 
shared problem. on the other hand, shared 
problems need to be formulated in a shared 
language, which is connected to our daily 
relations with the world, in line with Bohr’s 
view that there is no alternative to ordinary 
language for unambiguous description (Fa-
vrholdt 1999: xxxvii). The use of ordinary 
language is necessary for scientific com-
munication to couple with the experiences, 
feelings, and motivations of stakeholders in 
relation to wicked problems.
« 34 » The perspectival nature of sci-
entific disciplines leads to the problem of 
problem making. different disciplines nec-
essarily see different types of immediate 
problems due to their different methods 
and instruments of observation, different 
concepts, categories and theories, and dif-
ferent concerns, questions and values. Each 
research perspective forms its own version 
of what the problem is, and this is part of 
what makes the problem “wicked.” The par-
adox that has to be resolved in the face of 
wicked problems is thus that it takes a con-
certed effort to establish a shared problem, 
and it takes a shared problem to establish a 
concerted effort.
« 35 » Part of why having a shared 
problem is an essential motivation for in-
terdisciplinary research is that faced with a 
shared problem there is a need for a shared 
solution. (This is science taken as the key to 
societal learning, complex problem solving, 
and creative transformation.) But as we said, 
different scientific perspectives see differ-
ent immediate problems, and therefore they 
provide different solutions that often contra-
dict each other.
« 36 » The shared problem of interdisci-
plinary research is therefore only really pos-
sible in a second-order framework. Wicked 
problems, such as the current sustainability 
crises, can only be adequately addressed in 
a second-order problem solving process, 
where the shared problem can be formu-
lated in a polyocular way that is sufficiently 
flexible to incorporate the different versions 
of the problem that scientific perspectives 
offer, and that is thereby able to offer a com-
mon or coordinated solution.
« 37 » In headline form, the third prin-
ciple is: Second-order science of interdisci-
plinary research must establish a shared prob-
lem, because:
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  the shared problem is the driving force 
for doing interdisciplinary research;
  each research perspective forms its own 
version of what the problem is (and 
this is part of what makes the problem 
“wicked”);
  having a shared problem is a precondi-
tion for being able to offer a common or 
coordinated solution.
Principle 4 – Perspectives must 
see themselves as perspectives
« 38 » one of the typical problems of 
interdisciplinary research is a lack of re-
spect for other disciplines. The reason can 
be a hegemonic feeling of being the better 
science; that other disciplines are generally 
less scientific and their results therefore less 
dependable; or that other disciplines are 
generally too restricted by their theoretical 
framework and their results therefore less 
useful. or the reason can be a more specific 
assessment that since the other disciplines 
come up with other explanations and other 
solutions in this case where we really know 
what we are doing, they must be wrong.
« 39 » The perspectivist view of science 
recognizes that (1) there are many different 
scientific perspectives on any complex is-
sue, (2) these different perspectives can all 
contribute valuable observations, and (3) 
no single scientific discipline can provide 
adequate solutions to complex problems, 
and therefore it is a strong tool for founding 
mutual respect between even very different 
scientific perspectives.
« 40 » In fact, the second-order science 
of interdisciplinary research is dependent 
on the ability of the scientific disciplines 
involved to see themselves as perspectives, 
through self-observation, and acknowledge 
that they are one among many different per-
spectives. First, the very process of second-
order observation requires that first-order 
observations are made available for observa-
tion. The second-order science we describe 
is not just a science of sciences, such as so-
ciology of science, but a polyocular frame-
work based on scientific observations of 
scientific observations. and scientific obser-
vations cannot be observed without the will-
ing and skillful cooperation of the scientific 
perspective making those observations.
« 41 » second, establishing a shared 
dynamical object, which is required for in-
terdisciplinary research to qualify as inter-
disciplinary research at all, depends on the 
involved first-order scientific perspectives 
being able to distinguish between their im-
mediate objects and the dynamical objects 
that they refer to. There is no way in which 
an individual perspective can gain access to 
observe directly the difference between the 
immediate and the dynamical object. This 
distinction is only accessible as a theoretical 
construct that can be actualized in relation 
to other perspectives, through polyocular 
communication.
« 42 » Third, to help resolve a wicked 
problem in a constructive way, first-order 
perspectives must participate in the poly-
ocular communication about how their dif-
ferent immediate problems can contribute 
to the determination of a shared, polyocular 
problem. to do that, each scientific perspec-
tive needs to recognize itself as a perspective 
on the world among other valid and valuable 
perspectives. This can be difficult because 
researchers are usually not trained to think 
of their approaches as perspectives. and the 
first-order perspectives need to enter into a 
form of partnership where they promise not 
certain observations, but certain promises of 
observations by way of their perspective (cf. 
andersen 2008: 4).
« 43 » In headline form, the fourth 
principle is: Second-order science of inter-
disciplinary research must rely on first-order 
perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, 
because:
  this is necessary to make first-order per-
spectives volunteer their observations as 
objects for second-order observation;
  this is necessary to determine the dy-
namical object that is referred to by the 
immediate objects of the first-order per-
spectives;
  in order to observe wicked problems, 
the first-order perspectives must partic-
ipate in the polyocular communication 
about the shared problem.
Principle 5 – different rules for 
second-order science
« 44 » Polyocular cognition is the form 
of cognition needed to observe and un-
derstand complex phenomena. There is 
no holistic first-order perspective; no all-
encompassing perspective that can observe 
the whole of a complex phenomenon as a re-
placement for the many specialized perspec-
tives, and there is no complete cognition ex-
cept as an ideal limiting case (sensu Peirce).
« 45 » Polyocular cognition is based on 
observations of first-order observations, 
but it is not itself merely another first-order 
perspective. This does not mean that the 
polyocular second-order perspective is a 
privileged perspective; it is not a new gods-
eye perspective. Perspectivism must also be 
applied to itself. The second-order scientific 
perspective is itself an autopoietic social sys-
tem, it forms its own organization, and there 
can be different second-order perspectives 
on a complex phenomenon with different 
ideas about what the relevant first-order 
perspectives are and how the phenomenon 
is to be delimited.
« 46 » Polyocular cognition relies on 
collaboration with first-order perspectives, 
who must volunteer their observations for 
observation, as Principle 4 states, and of-
fer self-descriptions. The first-order per-
spectives can only make their observations 
available for (second-order) observation in 
form of communication, and polyocular 
cognition is therefore also dependent on 
polyocular communication. The polyocu-
lar communication must be able to handle 
first-order observations in the context of 
their perspectives (as observer-dependent 
knowledge).
« 47 » Monocular perspectives operate 
with simple truth claims and work to sharp-
en their observational abilities, whereas 
polyocular perspectives operate with con-
ditional truths, truths that only hold in the 
context of their perspective. From a radical 
constructivist view, there is no justification 
for an exclusive claim of objectivity (Riegler 
2001). The criterion of scientific excellence 
for polyocular research is not objectivity 
as the ideal of context-free knowledge, but 
reflexive objectivity, which implies that the 
cognitive context must be observed and in-
cluded in the scientific communication (al-
røe & Kristensen 2002; alrøe & Noe 2008). 
and this requires that the scientific perspec-
tive is self-reflexive, that it becomes aware of 
its own state and role as a perspective by way 
of self-observation or other second-order 
observation. Whereas disciplinary commu-
nication is about providing consistent, effi-
cient and precise knowledge in the context 
of a sharply delimited research world, poly-
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ocular communication is about extending a 
multidimensional space of understanding of 
the dynamical object under study.
« 48 » The polyocular framework can 
reveal new observational dimensions that 
cannot be observed from any first-order 
perspective, like binocular vision can re-
veal depth or distance. Gregory Bateson 
(1979: Chapter 3) described the elaborate 
anatomical structures behind binocular vi-
sion, and how the difference between the 
information from the two eyes creates an 
extra dimension to seeing: information 
about depth, which is of a different logical 
type. Maruyama posed the more radical 
idea of polyocular vision, across cultures, 
professions, or disciplines, where the dif-
ferent views are seen as complementary 
in a polyocular logics and “the differen-
tials between the different views enable 
us to add new dimensions to our percep-
tion” (Maruyama 1974: 187). He criticized 
previous interdisciplinary waves and sug-
gested immersion in other disciplines as a 
way to enable polyocular vision and avoid 
“subunderstanding” due to the dimension 
reduction and blind spots of a single disci-
pline (Maruyama 2004).
« 49 » Polyocular vision is therefore not 
merely a question of gathering collateral ex-
perience. It is a way of approaching an in-
depth multidimensional understanding of 
complex phenomena and wicked problems 
that requires synchronization and spatial 
coordination (in the timeframes and spaces 
employed) of the involved perspectives (this 
is developed more in the section “Phases of 
polyocular research”).
« 50 » In headline form, the fifth prin-
ciple is: Second-order science of interdisci-
plinary research must be based on other rules 
than first-order research, because:
  polyocular cognition is based on obser-
vations of first-order observations, it is 
not merely another first-order perspec-
tive;
  perspectives can only make their ob-
servations available for (second-order) 
observation in form of communication;
  polyocular communication must be able 
to handle first-order observations in the 
context of their perspectives (as observ-
er-dependent knowledge);
  while disciplinary communication is 
about providing consistent, efficient, 
and precise knowledge in the context 
of a sharply delimited research world, 
polyocular communication is about 
extending a multidimensional space of 
understanding that has its own require-
ments for synchronization and spatial 
coordination.
Implications for research
« 51 » In this section we describe the im-
plications of the polyocular framework for 
organizing and executing cross-disciplinary 
research. We present research methods and 
designs for doing second-order science in 
interdisciplinary research on the basis of 
the above principles as well as our experi-
ences and experiments within a range of 
interdisciplinary agroecological research 
projects. as a simple example, we have em-
ployed workshop setups where discussions 
have been carried out first in uniperspec-
tival groups (participants having the same 
perspective) and then in multiperspectival 
groups where participant with different per-
spectives are mixed.
« 52 » In a full-blown polyocular re-
search project, there are three levels of ob-
servation and three pivotal phases of carry-
ing out research (Figure 2 and table 1). The 
middle level of observation is the familiar 
first-order observation in research execu-
tion. The top level is second-order observa-
tion; this is the observation of observations 
made from different scientific perspectives, 
including the self-observations of first-order 
perspectives (Luhmann 2000: 62f). First-
order observation is necessarily unobserv-
able to itself, and only becomes observable 
in second-order observation, which can 
place first-order observations in the context 
of the perspective that has determined the 
observations. on the bottom level we have 
the dynamical objects that are presumed 
and hinted at in scientific observation, but 
which cannot directly enter into scientific 
communication. We characterize this as 
zeroth-order observation because, whereas 
second-order observation is the level of 
observation necessary for an observation 
to be seen as an observation, zeroth-order 
observation is the level of observation nec-
essary for an observation to be considered 
Polyocular communication
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Figure 2 • The polyocular framework for cross-disciplinary research, indicating three levels 
of observation (modified from Alrøe & Noe 2008 and Noe, Alrøe & Langvad 2008). Scientific 
perspectives are typically disciplines or subdisciplines; stakeholder perspectives can be key 
stakeholder associations, industries, governmental institutions, or NGOs. As in Figure 1, the 
dotted circles with arrows represent autopoietic social systems, and the eye symbol indicates 
that they are observing systems.
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an observation, though it cannot be seen. If 
there is no reference, however feeble, to “the 
dynamical object, or really efficient but not 
immediately present object,” as Peirce puts 
it, there is no observation.
« 53 » We have previously suggested 
second-order polyocular understandings 
of multifunctional farming (Noe, alrøe & 
Langvad 2008), organic agriculture (alrøe 
& Noe 2008), sustainability (Noe & alrøe 
2014a) and regulation (Noe & alrøe 2014b). 
The research project Multitrust11 was organ-
ized as a multi-perspectival approach that 
worked explicitly with the different aspects 
of multicriteria assessment of food system 
sustainability exposed by the involved sci-
entific perspectives in order to facilitate 
interdisciplinary research and enable the 
participation of a diverse range of organic 
actors and stakeholders in the project. at 
the onset of the project, all the involved 
partners produced self-descriptions of their 
own perspective on the problem of making, 
communicating, and implementing sustain-
ability assessments. an example of polyocu-
lar work in this project is a study on moti-
vation in sustainability assessment based on 
three research perspectives – an economic, 
a psychosocial, and a semiotically-based 
relational perspective – resulting in a mul-
tiperspectival research article (Læssøe et 
al. 2014). The polyocular work was difficult 
and unfamiliar for the researchers involved, 
but the experiment showed that such work 
can bring out a new level of understanding 
that could not be obtained otherwise. an 
added benefit was that this polyocular work 
encouraged mutual respect and insight be-
tween the research groups. another example 
from this project on polyocular understand-
ing is a scientific paper that investigates the 
role of values in different scientific perspec-
tives on sustainability assessments, without 
presuming a unitary conclusion is possible 
(Thorsøe, alrøe & Noe 2014).
« 54 » The current Eu project Healthy-
Growth12 is from start to finish organized 
around a polyocular framework: in-depth 
11 | “Multicriteria assessment and commu-
nication of effects of organic food systems,” 2011–
2014, funded by the danish Ministry of Food, see 
http://www.multitrust.org
12 | “Healthy growth: From niche to volume 
with integrity and trust,” 2013–2016, funded by 
case studies of mid-scale organic values-
based food chains are carried out in nine 
participating countries, followed by six com-
parative analyses based on different research 
perspectives and a multi-perspectival (poly-
ocular) meta-analysis. This is done to obtain 
a nuanced and coherent understanding of 
the underlying mechanisms and principles 
for a healthy growth of organic value chains. 
The project is still ongoing, but the prelimi-
nary experiences with polyocular research 
processes are similar to that in Multitrust.
« 55 » Experiences from these research 
projects show that the main challenge in im-
plementing the polyocular framework is that 
it involves a paradigmatic shift compared to 
conventional thinking about multi-, inter-, 
and transdisciplinary research. Multidisci-
plinary research, which involves coordinat-
ed but independent research perspectives on 
a given problem, does not ensure a shared 
dynamical object and therefore often fails to 
provide a shared solution. Interdisciplinary 
research, which involves a patchwork of co-
operating but still separate research perspec-
tives, is often synthesized through the lens of 
a dominating or hegemonic discipline (e.g., 
Noe, alrøe & Langvad 2008, Riegler 2005), 
and thus lacks the means to make fair use of 
the variety of first-order perspectives. trans-
disciplinary research generally provides a 
synthesis based on the transformation of 
the involved disciplines into a new theoreti-
cally integrated discipline or the formation 
of such a discipline in between the existing 
disciplines; this results in a new first-order 
perspective, which can be fine, but it is nei-
ther possible nor desirable as a general ap-
proach to cross-disciplinary research on 
wicked problems, which involves disciplines 
from across the human, social, and natural 
sciences.
« 56 » The polyocular framework in-
volves a paradigmatic shift because all the 
conventional approaches to cross-disciplin-
ary research remain first-order, whereas the 
perspectivist understanding of science leads 
to a second-order science of interdisciplin-
ary research that is qualitatively different. 
This is a shift to what may be labelled as 
“post-disciplinary research” in the sense of 
Karl Müller (2014): research that operates 
the European Commission’s 7th Framework Pro-
gramme, see http://www.healthygrowth.eu
on two different levels – a normal science 
level and a meta-level – and which thereby 
transcends the conventional disciplinary 
framework of science.
« 57 » Figure  2 includes scientific per-
spectives, with their special powers of obser-
vation, as well as other stakeholder perspec-
tives. Including stakeholder perspectives 
corresponds to moving from interdisciplin-
ary research to transdisciplinary research13, 
where stakeholder participation is consid-
ered a vital part of research. stakeholders, 
or actors, can have their own perspectives 
on a complex problem, which are important 
to include in cross-disciplinary research. 
stakeholder perspectives may be as mani-
fest as scientific perspectives, if they reside 
in an organizational structure where their 
perspective on the world is produced and 
reproduced as an important part of the au-
topoiesis of the organization (in accordance 
with social systems theory, see Luhmann 
1995, andersen 2003), such as, e.g., many 
NGos. They may be closely connected to 
particular scientific perspectives or be very 
different and based on specific forms of 
practices. In any case, they differ from sci-
entific perspectives in not necessarily being 
guided by the norms of scientific inquiry in 
their observations. But they may provide 
interactions through actor practices, which 
are very difficult to achieve in scientific ob-
servation. and they may suggest perspec-
tives that are not currently found in science.
three phases of polyocular 
research
« 58 » Based on our experiences and ex-
periments with polyocular research meth-
ods, table  1 sums up three pivotal phases 
of polyocular research. They are modelled 
on the familiar pragmatic problem-solving 
model of science, but incorporate the five 
principles of second-order science of in-
terdisciplinary research. In actual research 
there may well be iterations across these 
phases, such as going back to reassess the 
shared problem after some amount of re-
13 | transdisciplinary research in a different 
sense than the integrative sense above, namely 
interdisciplinary research that incorporates stake-
holders in the research process (e.g., Klein 2010).
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search studies, making a first attempt at a 
multidimensional understanding to help 
synchronize the different specialized re-
search efforts, or instigating changes and go-
ing back for a new round of observations to 
check the results. But this does not change 
the essential character of these three phas-
es. In table  1, the three phases are boldly 
named “shared problem,” “shared research” 
and “shared solution,” but, as the observant 
reader will suspect, these titles must be tak-
en with a grain of salt; taken literally they 
suggest a naïve idea of the options for do-
ing common research across different disci-
plines, which we have argued against above.
Phase 1 – establishing a shared 
problem
« 59 » The first phase of polyocular re-
search addresses the problem of problem-
making (e.g., when faced with a “wicked 
problem”). as a preparatory step for this 
and for the whole research endeavor, each 
perspective involved must make a self-de-
scription. The description should include 
the key interests (concerns, problems, 
questions, goals, values) in relation to the 
suggested cross-disciplinary research ef-
fort and the main ways of observing and 
tackling the suggested problem (practices, 
examples, and classifications, concepts and 
logic, theories and models, methods, and 
instruments). obviously, this phase runs 
into the paradox that it takes a concerted 
effort to establish a shared problem, and it 
takes a shared problem to establish a con-
certed effort (see “Principle 3 – a shared 
problem”). There is probably a need for an 
iterative process of making perspectival 
descriptions of immediate problems to 
resolve this paradox and create a shared 
polyocular problem. an important aim of 
this first phase of polyocular research is to 
move towards determining a shared dy-
namical object – a shared research object 
that can establish the collaborative research 
effort as interdisciplinary research proper.
Phase 2 – ensuring shared 
research
« 60 » The second phase of polyocular 
research addresses the mosaic of phenom-
ena offered by the involved perspectives as 
they carry out their research observations, 
which unfold dynamic objects by con-
structing and refining immediate objects 
(see Principle 2). Eventually, the studies are 
to contribute to a polyocular understand-
ing of the shared research object. The chal-
lenges and problems of cross-disciplinary 
research are deeply rooted in the differenti-
ation of disciplines that operate in different 
codes, delimitations, timescales, and spatial 
scales (Noe, alrøe & Langvad 2008). There-
fore there is a need to synchronize the re-
search efforts of the perspectives involved, 
using, among other things, the perspectival 
self-descriptions from Phase 1, so that the 
findings can enter into a multidimensional 
polyocular understanding in an unambigu-
ous way. But how to do this?
« 61 » The problem of communicating 
across disciplinary boundaries is recog-
nized as a key problem in interdisciplinary 
research (Bracken & oughton 2006; Har-
rison, Massey & Richards 2008; Riegler 
2005), and the languages of science are 
continuously diverging into new special-
ized languages (suppes 1978). No doubt 
“interactional expertise” in the sense of 
Harry Collins (2004), as the ability to com-
municate in the language of another per-
spective, plays some practical role in most 
interdisciplinary collaboration. and the 
amount of interactional expertise is prob-
ably decisive for the degree of interdisci-
plinary integration possible. But the notion 
of polyocular communication differs from 
ideas about interdisciplinary communica-
tion such as interactional expertise and 
“trading zones” (Collins, Evans & Gorman 
2007; Galison 1997: 803 ff). These focus 
exclusively on the possibility of commu-
nication between first-order perspectives, 
whereas the polyocular approach acknowl-
edges that first-order communication is 
not adequate as a general methodological 
approach to interdisciplinary communica-
tion (alrøe & Noe 2011).
« 62 » There is no common, first-order 
language that can be used in interdisciplin-
ary research. using the semantics of e.g., 
economics or general systems theory as a 
common language leads to hegemony, and 
blinds the communication to the insights 
of other perspectives. The “shared research” 
can only be shared and synchronized in a 
very specific, but crucial sense: that of 
second-order polyocular communication, 
which is the only generally applicable form 
of common communication in interdisci-
plinary research. Polyocular communica-
tion builds on self-observation, perspectiv-
al knowledges and grounding in a concrete 
wicked problem.
« 63 » First of all, the findings need to 
be communicated in a form that incor-
porates a description of the observational 
conditions that enabled the findings, in line 
with Bohr’s definition of phenomena. as 
noted in Principle 5, the scientific hallmark 
for polyocular research is the inclusion of 
the cognitive context in scientific commu-
nication. This perspectival communication 
is necessary for polyocular communication 
to avoid blind disagreement and miscom-
munication and enable coherence where 
there seems to be insurmountable contra-
diction between complementary perspec-
tives (alrøe & Noe 2011).
« 64 » The task of producing perspec-
tival knowledge relies on self-observation 
and the second-order observation of other 
perspectives to see how the perspectival 
context determines what the perspective is 
Phases 1 – Shared problem 2 – Shared research 3 – Shared solution
2nd order
Polyocular problem 
making (addressing the 
wicked problem)
Polyocular synchronization 
(addressing the mosaic of 
phenomena)
Polyocular understanding 
(addressing the plethora 
of solutions)
1st order
Perspectival descriptions 
(self-descriptions, 
immediate problems)
Perspectival observations 
(immediate objects)
Perspectival implications 
(immediate solutions)
0th order Determining a shared 
dynamical research object
Unfolding dynamical 
objects
Instigating dynamical 
change and transition
Table 1 • The three pivotal phases of a polyocular research project, indicating the research 
elements involved at each of the three levels of observation.
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able to observe and not able to observe. By 
contextualizing observations, specialized 
communication can enter into (second-
order) cross-disciplinary communication 
without becoming ambiguous due to shift-
ing contexts – it is transformed into gener-
ally understandable, and commensurable, 
communication.
« 65 » Finally, polyocular communica-
tion always takes place in relation to some-
thing concrete, here the specific wicked 
problem. The reference to the shared prob-
lem and a shared dynamical research object, 
which is made possible by contextualizing 
observations, enables the different scientific 
perspectives to synchronize their research 
efforts and communications.
Phase 3 – enabling a shared 
solution
« 66 » The third phase of polyocular 
research addresses the plethora of solutions 
offered by the perspectives involved. Poly-
ocular understanding – the multidimen-
sional space of understanding that can be 
established through polyocular observation 
and communication of the perspectival ob-
servations in Phase 2 – forms the basis for 
a shared or coordinated effort to instigating 
change and transformation. an important 
precondition is that, just as any observa-
tion that is part of inquiry must be made 
through an established perspective, any 
deliberate approach to instigate change and 
transformation must take place through an 
established perspective. such perspectives 
can be very different, from practice-based 
stakeholder perspectives to high-tech scien-
tific perspectives, but there is no way around 
perspectives to attempt changing dynamical 
objects intelligently.
« 67 » There are particular requirements 
for polyocular research projects to gain 
support in competition with conventional 
disciplinary or multidisciplinary research. 
Firstly, the second-order science framework 
needs to be recognized as scientifically valid 
and valuable. secondly, the procedures for 
project application and evaluation need 
to take into account the special features 
of second-order science, for instance that 
problem-making and synchronization of 
the scientific perspectives are part of the re-
search project and not something that can 
be done in advance.
Stakeholder participation
« 68 » as noted earlier, the paradoxical 
challenge of solving (or alleviating) wicked 
problems is that they can only be observed 
and addressed through particular special-
ized perspectives, but a common solution is 
needed. Polyocular research and polyocular 
understanding is a way to resolve this para-
dox, but polyocular research also poses dis-
tinct challenges with regard to stakeholder 
participation.
« 69 » When dealing with wicked prob-
lems, participation of stakeholders is need-
ed from Phase 1, since the establishment 
of a shared problem must also be based on 
how the problem is experienced outside of 
science. and stakeholder participation is 
equally needed in Phase 3, since a shared 
solution cannot be found and instigated 
based on scientific perspectives alone, but 
needs to involve the relevant practices in 
society. In general, stakeholder involvement 
in cross-disciplinary research is faced with 
the two-fold challenge of how the varied 
and fragmented knowledge of science is 
made accessible for stakeholders and how 
the many different interests and perspec-
tives of stakeholders are made accessible 
for the scientific endeavors. The polyocu-
lar framework outlined in Figure  2 treats 
scientific and stakeholder perspectives in 
parallel, allowing polyocular observation 
of all the perspectives. By being based on 
ordinary language and by contextualiz-
ing specialized observations, polyocular 
communication can become accessible for 
stakeholders, political decision makers and 
scientific experts alike.
Implications for practice
« 70 » In the previous sections we have 
sketched the implications of the perspectiv-
ist view for research, but what are the im-
plications for practice? on the one hand 
the second-order science framework for 
interdisciplinary research is a way forward 
to address the wicked problems of society, 
remedying the shortcomings of the existing 
scientific approaches. on the other hand, 
polyocular answers may be seen as a new 
challenge for making decisions based on 
science. There is strong competition with 
monocular answers, which offer an exten-
sive reduction of complexity and simple 
truths. But of course this reduction comes 
at the expense of the big picture. However, 
the competition between basing decisions 
on few or many perspectives is nothing 
new; the news is that the polyocular frame-
work provides a coordinated and intelli-
gible perspectival understanding based on 
multiple perspectives.
« 71 » apart from the direct implica-
tions for cross-disciplinary research proper, 
the perspectivist view of science also has 
implications for the use of science in soci-
etal decisions on complex problems, such 
as reviews (assessment and synthesis) of 
disciplinary knowledges from a problem-
oriented perspective in policy or practice, 
or the direct use of a range of specialized 
knowledges from across the sciences in 
such decision processes. space does not al-
low us to develop these implications here, 
but we think the polyocular framework can 
in many ways be adopted to this broader 
use of science.
« 72 » More generally, the perspectiv-
ist view of science has implications for how 
scientific expertise is dealt with in demo-
cratic processes. There is a peculiarly strong 
idea that “economics,” or “science” in a nar-
row sense, has the right and the only answer 
to the complex problems of society. select-
ed scientific experts, or monocular expert 
commissions (often consisting of neoclas-
sical economists), are commonly used to 
underpin certain political decisions. The 
uniperspectival basis enables the argument 
that the decision is “necessary” by eschew-
ing the broader range of perspectives that 
might suggest other possible decisions. and 
with a careful selection of scientific experts, 
most political positions can claim to be 
based on a firm scientific grounding. Even 
though it is evident that different scientific 
experts give different advice, the scientifica-
tion of politics is still a strong trend. If the 
construction occasionally breaks down, the 
blame is usually placed on the experts being 
political and in essence unscientific. That 
may of course be the case, but in general sci-
entific experts can be expected to give dif-
ferent advice, based on a perspectivist view 
of science, and we have to let go of the idea 
of that there is one common rationality. The 
idea of polyocular understanding would 
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provide a very different scientific input to 
democratic debate and political decision 
making, and polyocular inquiry and learn-
ing could help us resolve the paradox of 
scientific expertise by enabling us to better 
handle perspectival knowledge differences.
Future directions
« 73 » In the present paper we have 
described the polyocular methodological 
framework and introduced the theoretical 
background necessary to substantiate this 
approach. But the perspectivist approach 
to interdisciplinary science raises a range 
of other fundamental issues that would be 
interesting to pursue in the future. Here we 
will sketch three such issues: ontology, in-
commensurability, and complementarity.
« 74 » The perspectivist approach to sci-
ence has decisive implications for the discus-
sions on realism, constructivism, and relativ-
ism (Giere 2006a: 4–20; alrøe & Noe 2012), 
and Ronald Giere has given substantial argu-
ments to show that “perspectival realism is as 
much realism as science can provide” (Giere 
2006a: 20). In connection with this general 
discussion, there are also distinct implica-
tions for the concept of ontology. The per-
spectivist approach starts with observation, 
and thereby primarily with an epistemologi-
cal and constructivist understanding. This 
does not mean that there is no need for an 
ontological foundation. But this foundation 
must be in the form of a “working ontology,” 
in accordance with the fallibilist nature of 
science (Müller 2007; Noe & alrøe 2003). 
The foundational working ontologies of sci-
entific perspectives are indispensable and 
must be discussed as intensely as realists dis-
cuss “reality.” But it remains to be investigat-
ed how the working ontologies of different 
scientific perspectives in interdisciplinary 
research can be processed in the framework 
of second-order science to form a multidi-
mensional working ontology as the basis for 
polyocular understanding.
« 75 » Kuhn’s views on the incommen-
surability between consecutive paradigms 
correspond to problems in integrating and 
communicating across perspectives in 
cross-disciplinary work (alrøe & Noe 2011). 
But where Kuhn’s approach was linguistic, 
talking of the untranslatability between dif-
ferent paradigms (Kuhn 2000, Chen 1997), 
the perspectivist approach points out that 
the reason why it is difficult to communicate 
across perspectives is because each observa-
tional perspective has its own phenomenal 
world – its own representation of the world 
entailed in theories, models, concepts, clas-
sifications, and examples. The perspectival 
understanding of incommensurability is a 
deeper reason than language, tied into the 
specific observational apparatus and the spe-
cific forms of interaction provided by it. de-
spite the common features, our synchronic 
and explicitly perspectivist approach leads 
to other questions and other answers than 
Kuhn’s diachronic and historical approach, 
and this can provide a new angle on the con-
tested issue of incommensurability. The bar-
riers of communication between scientific 
perspectives are not lifted, but transcended 
through a separate process of polyocular 
communication that includes observations 
on what the different perspectives can and 
cannot observe.
« 76 » as we have argued, polyocular 
communication can only happen with ref-
erence to a shared dynamic object that is 
observed through different scientific per-
spectives. We must expect this sometimes to 
bring forth mutually excluding representa-
tions of the research object, that is, comple-
mentary phenomena in Niels Bohr’s sense. 
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Bohr and others have pointed out that there 
are complementary phenomena in a range 
of other areas of science beyond quantum 
physics (e.g., Favrholdt 1999; Folse 1985), 
but very little has been done to investigate 
what complementarity means for cross-
disciplinary research (alrøe & Noe 2011). 
some of the tasks for such an investiga-
tion are to develop a typology of forms of 
complementary phenomena, and use this 
typology to identify forms of complemen-
tarity between scientific perspectives and 
their relation to the general conditions for 
observation. Based on this, an analysis can 
be made of what role complementarity plays 
in cross-disciplinary research, how scien-
tific disagreements may be connected to the 
complementarity of scientific perspectives, 
and what this means for the options to pro-
duce unambiguous descriptions of complex 
phenomena through second-order science.
Conclusion
« 77 » The paradoxical challenge of solv-
ing (or alleviating) wicked problems is that 
they can only be observed and addressed 
through particular perspectives, but a com-
mon solution is needed. Polyocular research 
is a way to transgress this paradox, and in 
this paper we have outlined a polyocular 
framework for wicked problems that forms 
a new basis for planning and performing in-
terdisciplinary research. We have identified 
five principles for second-order science of 
interdisciplinary research. It must:
1 | draw on the observations of first-order 
perspectives,
2 | address a shared dynamical object,
3 | establish a shared problem,
4 | rely on first-order perspectives to see 
themselves as perspectives, and
5 | be based on other rules than first-order 
research.
« 78 » The polyocular framework can 
be characterized in a three by three matrix 
of observational levels and research phases. 
The observational levels are the level of fa-
miliar research work (first-order observa-
tion), the level of dynamical objects that are 
hinted at in scientific observation, but which 
cannot directly enter into scientific commu-
nication (zeroth-order observation), and the 
level of polyocular communication based on 
observations of observations made by differ-
ent scientific perspectives (second-order ob-
servation). The three research phases follow 
the conventional problem-solving approach, 
and at the level of second-order observa-
tion, the three phases are polyocular prob-
lem making, polyocular synchronization, 
and polyocular understanding. Polyocular 
vision can reveal new observational dimen-
sions that cannot be observed from any first-
order perspective, like binocular vision can 
reveal depth or distance. solving (or allevi-
ating) complex problems requires the par-
ticipation of stakeholders. In Phase one they 
are needed to establish a shared problem, 
and in Phase three they are equally needed 
to find and instigate a shared solution. The 
twofold challenge of making the fragmented 
knowledge of science accessible to stake-
holders and making the diverse interests 
and perspectives of stakeholders accessible 
to science can only be overcome by making 
both scientific and stakeholder perspectives 
explicit, and by grounding the polyocular 
communication on ordinary language that 
is accessible to the diversity of stakeholders 
and scientific experts. The idea of polyocu-
lar understanding can also provide a very 
different input from science to democratic 
debate and political decision-making: a co-
ordinated and intelligible perspectival un-
derstanding based on multiple perspectives. 
There is strong competition with monocular 
answers that offer a more extensive reduc-
tion of complexity and simple truths, but 
polyocular inquiry and learning could help 
us resolve the paradox of scientific expertise 
by enabling us to better handle perspectival 
knowledge differences.
« 79 » The main challenge for imple-
menting the polyocular framework is that 
this is a paradigmatic shift compared to 
traditional thinking about multi-, inter-, 
and trans-disciplinary research; a shift to 
what may be labelled as “post-disciplinary 
research” (sensu Müller), which retains the 
strengths of first-order science but adds 
the strengths of second-order science. This 
challenge is accentuated because the new 
framework for interdisciplinary research 
is decisively constructivist and perspectiv-
ist, whereas some of the first-order scien-
tific perspectives that are required to take 
an active part in the framework may have a 
more realist view of science. In other words, 
the successful implementation of this new 
framework demands that those involved 
in the interdisciplinary research, at least to 
some degree, subscribe to the perspectivist 
view.
« 80 » With regard to the special issue 
on second-order science, of which the pres-
ent paper is part, these findings show that 
the (constructivist, observer-inclusive) per-
spectivist approach offers workable methods 
and research designs for doing second-order 
science. Ideally, the second-order polyocular 
framework can produce perspectival knowl-
edge and a multidimensional understanding 
that cannot be assembled from any number 
of first-order perspectives. The outcome is 
not a new global integration of knowledge, 
but a specific polyocular understanding of 
the concrete wicked problem based on a re-
alization of the scope and limits of the differ-
ent perspectives involved. The second-order 
approach to interdisciplinary science offers 
a harsh critique of most cross-disciplinary 
research efforts on wicked problems, which 
are less than successful because they remain 
first-order. But it also offers a view of dif-
ferent (first-order) scientific perspectives as 
valid and valuable in their own right and the 
only access to observing wicked problems, 
which might encourage more mutual re-
spect between different disciplines and sci-
ences than is common today. The perspec-
tivist understanding of science that we have 
presented here, shows that ideas and theo-
retical grounding for second-order science 
can be found in Peircean semiotics, though 
this is not commonly seen as a constructiv-
ist approach. Luhmannian social systems 
theory is also brought to the fore here, and 
Luhmann calls for second-order cybernetics 
because any first-order observation of the 
environment is not in a position to grasp the 
wicked problem of environmental sustain-
ability:
“ We have to choose a second-order cybernetics 
as the point of departure. We have to see that what 
cannot be seen cannot be seen. only then can we 
discover why it is so difficult for our society to re-
act to the exposure to ecological dangers despite, 
and even because of, its numerous function sys-
tems.” (Luhmann 1989: 26)
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> upshot • I draw connections between 
the target article and the broader litera-
ture on interdisciplinarity, highlighting 
areas of both agreement and disagree-
ment. Suggestions are made regarding 
how interdisciplinary research should 
proceed.
« 1 » The literature on interdisciplinar-
ity is widely dispersed. Yet there is, I think, 
increasing consensus among those who 
study interdisciplinarity around the nature 
of both interdisciplinarity itself and sound 
interdisciplinary research practices. I very 
much liked Hugo alrøe and Egon Noe’s tar-
get article, in part because it reinforces much 
of what I and other scholars associated with 
the association for Interdisciplinary studies 
(aIs) have been saying for some time. Yet 
the authors examine these issues from a dif-
ferent perspective than my own. as we both 
agree, it is by looking at issues from multiple 
perspectives that we gain our best under-
standing. I will in this commentary outline 
areas of both agreement and disagreement.
« 2 » The idea of “disciplinary perspec-
tive” has been central to the discourse in aIs 
for decades, though it is only in recent years 
that the components of disciplinary perspec-
tive have received much attention. The key 
elements of this are now clear to both of us: 
theories, methods, concepts, questions (§13). 
We would add “epistemological outlook” and 
stress that these various elements are mutu-
ally reinforcing: methods are chosen that are 
good at investigating favored theories, and 
variables are investigated that are implicated 
by theory and amenable to methods. We 
would also stress that perspective is largely 
subconscious, and that it is strongly rein-
forced by Ph.d committees, journal editors, 
hiring committees, and tenure and promo-
tion committees. But we agree with these au-
thors on the central point: that disciplinary 
perspective shapes the way that disciplinary 
scholars approach their research. and one 
of the key barriers to interdisciplinarity is 
indeed that each discipline regards its ap-
proach as superior (§38): note that scholars 
in one discipline are likely to doubt results 
obtained in other disciplines because these 
not only use the “wrong” theory and method 
but investigate the “wrong” variables. schol-
ars in one discipline will be very familiar 
with the standards employed to evaluate re-
search in their own discipline but are often 
doubtful that such standards exist elsewhere.
« 3 » “Interdisciplinarity” is, the target 
authors and I both appreciate, a contested 
term. as university presidents and granting 
agencies sing its praises, it is hardly surpris-
ing that many scholars have declared them-
selves interdisciplinary without reflecting on 
what this means. The mission that alrøe and 
Noe and I share, of defining interdisciplinar-
ity and suggesting how this is best pursued, 
is thus a vital one. superficial analysis pass-
ing itself off as interdisciplinary threatens 
the entire interdisciplinary project. It is not 
enough to do a little reading in another dis-
cipline or have coffee with someone from 
another department – valuable though such 
practices are – in order to be truly interdis-
ciplinary. It is thus unfortunate that these 
authors themselves equate “interdisciplinar-
ity” as practiced at present with disciplinary 
imperialism (§55).
« 4 » Good interdisciplinary research, we 
both agree, requires that we self-consciously 
look at issues from multiple perspectives. 
scholars associated with aIs have delineated 
what this might look like: we suggest a focus 
on the “insights” (conclusions) reached with-
in each perspective, we stress the importance 
of an unbiased research question (object), we 
urge evaluating insights within the context of 
the perspective in which they were generated, 
and we have identified a handful of strategies 
for integrating insights into a more holistic 
understanding.1
« 5 » The authors say relatively little 
about how we might evaluate the insights 
generated within different perspectives. one 
useful approach here is to appreciate the key 
strengths and weaknesses of different meth-
ods and types of theory. Even specialist schol-
ars will generally appreciate that their favored 
theory and method are imperfect, though 
they are likely to judge all alternatives as far 
worse. The interdisciplinary message is that 
different theories and methods often have 
compensating strengths and weaknesses. 
one method may be good at examining nu-
merous data points simultaneously, while an-
other is good at providing detailed analysis of 
one event or process. one theory may stress 
an agent’s rational impulses, while another 
theory emphasizes the agent’s non-rational 
impulses: both impulses may be at play.
« 6 » It is also useful to ask if the theo-
ry of one discipline excludes variables that 
other disciplines suggest might be impor-
1 | The book by allen Repko (2012), which 
the authors cite, is a good resource here, as is the 
“about Interdisciplinarity” section of the aIs 
website at http://www.units.muohio.edu/aisorg/
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tant. to avoid the risk that all disciplines are 
missing something in addressing a particu-
lar problem, recourse can be had to a clas-
sification of all of the things investigated by 
scientists – this hopefully approximates the 
set of things that people care about. It can 
then be asked if a particular theory can be 
expanded to embrace other variables.
« 7 » The value of this paper is that alrøe 
and Noe reach important conclusions regard-
ing the nature of interdisciplinarity from a 
“perspectival” perspective. Much of the liter-
ature on interdisciplinarity has emerged from 
the practice of interdisciplinary teaching and 
research. It is also very important to ground 
interdisciplinary practice in philosophical 
reflection. The authors start from the recog-
nition that observers shape what is observed. 
They note that philosophers of science have 
devoted far too little time to grappling with 
the challenges of interdisciplinarity. They 
hope that their paper will provide a philo-
sophical justification for and understanding 
of interdisciplinarity. This is a laudable goal.
« 8 » I myself have urged a “Golden 
Mean” approach to a variety of epistemologi-
cal questions (szostak 2007). We need to cri-
tique the (often “positivist”) assumptions on 
which disciplinary hegemony rests. Yet we 
must do so without abandoning hope of sci-
entific progress, for there is no value in inter-
disciplinarity unless it allows understandings 
that are in some way superior. These authors 
clearly embrace the idea of scientific progress 
(§11). However, they could have been clearer 
with respect to other epistemological issues. 
Though thoroughly “perspectival,” they ar-
gue that we can gain an “unambiguous” 
description of a “complex phenomenon” by 
looking at this from multiple perspectives 
(§22). Is there perhaps an objective exter-
nal reality that we are limited in our ability 
to perceive but gain a better appreciation of 
by examining from different angles? It would 
seem that alrøe and Noe must embrace du-
alism here but do not say so. They seem to 
speak favorably of the idea of incommensu-
rability early on (§12), but admit later that 
some significant degree of cross-disciplinary 
understanding is possible (§75). I think we 
cannot speak of scientific progress unless we 
can understand each other well enough to 
recognize progress collectively.
« 9 » The authors at times exaggerate 
the novelty of their approach. This is under-
standable given the vast and diverse litera-
ture on interdisciplinarity. They argue that 
interdisciplinary scholars have stressed the 
language barriers to cross-disciplinary com-
munication but not the perspectival barriers 
(§61). I would point them to o’Rourke et 
al. (2014), which addresses both challenges. 
The book grew out of the toolbox project at 
the university of Idaho: members of (dozens 
of) interdisciplinary research teams were 
given an epistemological questionnaire, the 
different answers were then discussed by 
the research group, and the questionnaire 
re-applied. The range of answers generally 
narrowed, and team members reported that 
it was useful to appreciate the different per-
spectives of team members.
« 10 » alrøe and Noe’s proposals clearly 
overlap a great deal with those in Repko 
(2012): clarifying terminology, analyzing 
each insight within its perspective, mapping 
the connections among phenomena. Yet there 
seems very little about what I would see as the 
critical step of integration. There is a remark, 
“any deliberate approach to instigate change 
and transformation must take place through 
an established perspective” (§66) that I find 
rather cryptic. Repko (2012) instead stresses 
the value of finding some common ground: a 
concept or conceptual map or even a theory 
that all might potentially accept. This seems 
to be an important distinction. I do not see 
how the value of examining issues from mul-
tiple perspectives can be achieved unless we 
are able in the end to achieve some superior 
cross-disciplinary understanding.
« 11 » Careful definition of key con-
cepts is one strategy for achieving common 
ground. scholars sometimes appear to dis-
agree because they define key terminology 
in different ways. Mapping the key causal 
relations involved in a complex problem is 
another: specialized scholars may disagree 
about the relative importance of different re-
lationships but can potentially appreciate the 
overall set of relationships. sometimes it is 
possible to expand a theory to embrace the 
variables emphasized by each perspective. 
When disciplines seem to disagree directly, 
it is often useful to transform dichotomies 
into continua: the economist’s emphasis on 
rationality and the sociologist’s emphasis on 
non-rationality can be combined if we ap-
preciate that humans are neither completely 
rational nor non-rational. strategies such as 
these respect the importance of disciplin-
ary perspective while allowing us to achieve 
cross-disciplinary understanding.
« 12 » The authors do not quite say it, 
but the implication of their paper is that the 
academy needs a body of scholars who are 
self-consciously interdisciplinary, and take as 
their task the examination of complex prob-
lems from multiple perspectives. such schol-
ars cannot replace disciplinary specialists but 
rather work symbiotically with these: draw-
ing on specialized perspectival understand-
ings and feeding back information regarding 
what might be learned from other perspec-
tives. Happily, this sort of interdisciplinarity 
is entirely feasible: one need not master mul-
tiple disciplines but rather evaluate their in-
sights into a particular problem in the context 
of disciplinary perspective. strategies have 
been identified for each step in the interdis-
ciplinary research process. Both individually 
and in teams, interdisciplinary scholars can 
usefully integrate diverse insights from di-
verse disciplines. The skills and attitudes of 
such interdisciplinary scholars may be quite 
different from those of disciplinary special-
ists, but the academy needs them both.
« 13 » In sum, I applaud alrøe and Noe 
for providing a philosophical analysis of in-
terdisciplinarity, for advocating a philosoph-
ically sound and feasible type of interdiscipli-
narity that will encourage scientific progress, 
and for suggesting what this approach might 
look like in practice. I join them in urging a 
specific understanding of “interdisciplinari-
ty” centered on an appreciation of the impor-
tance of disciplinary perspective. We need to 
ensure that when granting agencies, univer-
sity administrators, and journal editors seek 
to encourage interdisciplinarity, they have a 
strong sense of what good interdisciplinary 
practice involves.
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> upshot • I critically assess Alrøe and 
Noe’s plea for a “second-order science 
of interdisciplinary research” from the 
perspective of a consistently natural-
ized philosophy of science, arguing that 
the latter precludes the “levels view” 
of science implied by the former. I also 
suggest we avoid the term “polyocu-
larity” as it perpetuates the persistent 
bias toward vision in our scientific and 
philosophical understanding of human 
perception.
« 1 » Having recommended scientific 
perspectivism myself as the best remedy at 
hand to counter the dominant “flat earth 
perspective” (Mesarovic & sreenath 2006) 
in systems biology, and the “gene’s eye view” 
and related temptations in big data science 
more generally (Callebaut 2012), I applaud 
the spirit of Hugo alrøe and Egon Noe’s 
perspectivist manifesto (for that is what 
it is: a promissory framework that invites 
further implementation.) But I disagree 
on several of their specifics. The critical re-
marks that follow mostly aim at generalizing 
the authors’ proposal, and should be read in 
the spirit of sympathetic approbation.
« 2 » Referring to Julie Klein, the au-
thors state, without offering much of an ar-
gument, that “the problems most in need of 
interdisciplinary cooperation” – and hence 
most prone to benefit from their second-
order, polyocular framework – “are ‘wick-
ed problems’ such as food crises, climate 
change mitigation, and other resilience 
and sustainability problems” (§2; see also 
§55). The notion of “wicked problems” as 
presented here, which the authors associ-
ate with “post-disciplinary research,” re-
mains somewhat woolly for my taste. But I 
propose it could be made more precise in 
terms of silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ra-
vetz’s articulation of a framework for post-
normal science (inspired by Thomas Kuhn’s 
“normal science”). Post-normal science 
is the outer layer of their cake diagram, 
which has applied science at the core and 
professional consultancy in the middle; it 
is characterized as combining the highest 
decision stakes (for instance, life or death 
issues) with the greatest systems uncertain-
ties (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990).
« 3 » a perspectivist reflection on the 
inclusion of “extra-scientific” stakehold-
ers among the actors in post-disciplinary 
research, I would think, could also benefit 
from a confrontation with the literature in-
stigated by Esben andersen’s (1991) work 
on “techno-economic paradigms.” In addi-
tion to enabling coordination of the pro-
duction of knowledge, techno-economic 
paradigms are also a means of coordina-
tion between groups of producers and users 
of specific types of artefacts, etc. (the idea 
can be readily generalized) as shared speci-
fications of typical interfaces between the 
two parties. In particular, this literature 
can offer perspectivists useful clues as to 
the necessary tradeoff between, on the one 
hand, the requirement of simplicity and 
standardization of such interfaces, imposed 
by human bounded rationality (Callebaut 
2007), and, on the other, the requirement 
of information-rich interactions and non-
standardized interfaces necessary for suc-
cessful product innovation, etc.
« 4 » Contrary to what the authors sug-
gest (§§6, 56, 79), I see no good reasons to 
restrict “polyocular” problem solving to the 
sole realm of “post-disciplinary research.” 
Perspectivism seems to me to be the way to 
go in the domains of professional consul-
tancy and applied science as well, and, in-
deed, in science generally, as Ronald Giere 
and Bas van Fraassen, among others, have 
suggested. The history of science abounds 
with episodes where problems that are 
deemed worth solving in a field (including 
Kuhnian “anomalies”) can only be tack-
led fruitfully by appealing to the resources 
(methods, techniques, concepts, theories, 
etc.) of another field (see, e.g., darden & 
Maull 1977; Callebaut 2010 applies their ac-
count of “interfield theories” to the history 
and aftermath of the Modern synthesis in 
biology). alrøe and Noe (§6 and §62) right-
ly point to the problem of hegemonic claims 
by one field over the other(s) that often arise 
in such situations of knowledge transfer. 
But these situations seem to me to be almost 
the rule – by no means are they restricted to 
“wicked problem” solving. Perspectivism, I 
suggest, is needed everywhere (and, actually, 
not just within science and its philosophy)!
« 5 » Perspectivism has an impres-
sive philosophical pedigree; alrøe and 
Noe mention only Immanuel Kant, Frie-
drich Nietzsche, and José ortega y Gasset, 
but one could add Gottfried Leibniz, John 
dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, Paul Feyerabend, and several 
others with equal right. However, scientific 
perspectivism has come to the fore only 
quite recently (Giere and van Fraassen, as 
mentioned by the authors, but prominently 
also Griesemer 2002, and Wimsatt 2007). It 
is not, as of now, a unitary stance, and has 
barely begun (with the exception of van 
Fraassen) to tap the many rich resources 
the older perspectivisms have to offer. as 
far as I am concerned, the first priority on 
the scientific-perspectivist agenda should 
be the elaboration of a grammar of perspec-
tives (Callebaut 2012: 79), to which alrøe 
and Noe, I am afraid, have not begun to 
contribute.
« 6 » For fairness’ sake, it should be 
stressed that with the sole exception of van 
Fraassen (who now prefers to label his own 
constructive-empiricist position as “em-
piricist structuralism”), the scientific per-
spectivists I am aware of (and this includes 
myself) aim to be as “realistic,” epistemo-
logically speaking, as is reasonably possible. 
The intimate connection between “poly-
ocular perspectivism” and “constructivism” 
that alrøe and Noe take for granted – with-
out much clarification of what they mean 
exactly by “constructivism” – seems to me 
optional to at least some extent. Please read 
this as a comment about constructivists and 
realists! Here I fully endorse van Fraassen’s 
call, in his Scientific Representation, for co-
operation across the empiricism/realism 
divide:
“ While this will undoubtedly shape my discus-
sion, I have tried to write as much as possible of 
this book in a way that does not trade on the dif-
ferences between this view of science (‘construc-
tive empiricism’) and its contraries (‘scientific 
realisms’). What scientific representation is and 
how it works is everyone’s concern, and there we 
may find a large area where more general philo-
sophical differences need make no difference.” 
(van Fraassen 2008: 3)
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« 7 » social constructivism at large 
has benefited our global understanding of 
science in counter-balancing the rational-
ist excesses of the pre-Kuhnian philoso-
phies of science in the analytic tradition. 
But for a long time it has also been largely 
counterproductive by delighting in “silly” 
(dixit Giere) epistemological relativisms 
(mostly to provoke philosophers) instead 
of doing proper – sociological – work 
(see, e.g., Kitcher 1998; Hull 2000). I urge 
“polyocular” researchers to try to avoid 
making similar mistakes – roughly, having 
order two “control” order one. although 
the authors seem to be aware of this dan-
ger, I still want to ventilate my worry that 
a too strict separation, in both conceptual 
and sociological terms, between their first 
and second orders could lead to new alien-
ations. In Henri atlan’s (1986: 336) words: 
let us avoid the pitfalls of “a sociology that 
unveils the truth about the sciences.” al-
røe and Noe remain silent on who are to 
be the polyocular problem solvers. I would 
suggest that, rather than a separate caste 
of holders of a “new paradigm” (§55 and 
§79), these should first and foremost be the 
scientists themselves (and of course, in the 
cases envisaged by the authors, other direct 
stakeholders as well). occasionally (most 
notably in §74), alrøe and Noe’s proposal 
still smacks of what donald Campbell used 
to call “foundationalist longings,” whereas 
the apter metaphor to go with perspectiv-
ism is scaffolding (Caporael, Griesemer & 
Wimsatt 2013).
« 8 » This brings me to my main objec-
tion: a consistently naturalized philosophy 
of science precludes a “levels view” of sci-
ence. Naturalistic philosophy of science is 
the position toward which post-relativistic 
(including post-Kuhnian) philosophies 
of science have been converging in recent 
decades (Callebaut 2003). The point of de-
parture of philosophical naturalism is not 
the epistemic subject’s phenomenal world 
but the physical world at large, which it 
regards as a natural unity that includes hu-
man beings. Naturalistic epistemology and 
ontology are neither intuited nor the result 
of some transcendental reduction, but de-
rived from our current understanding of 
inorganic, organic, and cognitive evolution. 
Naturalistic understanding is also based on 
a peculiar but plausible interpretation of 
the historical relation between science and 
its philosophy. on this view, science is a self-
corrective activity, and the theory of science 
may be viewed as a sort of “meta-learning 
module” that allows science to “learn how 
to learn” (shapere 1984). This research 
strategy, which regards all ontology as the-
ory-dependent, is in line with Quine’s “on-
tological relativity,” and more generally with 
the naturalist’s rejection of any first philoso-
phy whatsoever.
« 9 » However, “meta-learning” should 
not invite us to think that naturalistic theo-
ries of science require a “levels view” of 
science – one that dismisses, say, cognitive 
evolution at the “methodological” level, as 
was the case in the logical empiricists’ and 
Popper’s analytic a priori philosophies of 
science. as a matter of principle, any natu-
ralistic/scientific account of science must 
be reflexive, for otherwise one would “get 
out of the system.” atlan’s (1986) “acrobatic 
reason” is an apt description of what is at 
stake here: a reason without safety net (filet) 
that can no longer take advantage of a meta-
discourse, of a meta-theory (meta-physical, 
meta-biological, meta-psychological, or 
other).
« 10 » Irrespective of the accomplish-
ments of second-order cybernetics (which I 
am not in a position to comment on compe-
tently), I want to drive home the point that 
scientific perspectivism, which is largely a 
particular elaboration of the naturalistic 
account of science, is better not phrased in 
terms of first- and second-order science, or 
“levels.” Interestingly, the same point has 
been made by Niklas Luhmann, an author 
whom alrøe and Noe cherish:
“ Irrespective of specific theory assumptions 
(concerning consciousness, reason, subjectivity), 
one can characterize a theory [of knowledge] as 
transcendental if it does not allow the conditions 
of knowledge to be questioned by the results of 
knowledge. transcendental theories disallow 
self-referential conclusions. In contrast, theo-
ries can be considered as empirical or natural-
istic if they do not exempt themselves from the 
domain of objects worth knowing, but concern 
themselves with empirical research, and allow a 
restriction of the range of knowable options.” 
(Luhmann 1990: 15f; my translation)
This is not a mere quibble over words.
« 11 » to round off, I would like to sug-
gest sticking to “perspectivism” (or, if one 
prefers, “multi-perspectivism”) to denote 
the enterprise we are jointly advocating, 
and refrain from using the term “polyocu-
larity,” for the very simple reason that the 
latter perpetuates the persistent bias toward 
vision in our scientific and philosophical 
understanding of human perception to the 
detriment of audition, olfaction, and other 
human senses (Barwich 2014). If, for in-
stance, with the authors we are interested 
in food, we will want to know, among other 
things, how it tastes. Here mere polyocu-
larity will not do; it will have to be supple-
mented by other perceptual investigations, 
including qualitative ones (see, e.g., Levin-
son & Majid 2014). science does extend be-
yond the realm of the quantitative (Rudolph 
2013)!
Werner Callebaut (Ph.D. in Philosophy, Ghent 
University 1983) is the scientific director of the KLI 
Institute, Klosterneuburg, Austria; a visiting research 
professor of philosophy of science in the Department 
of Theoretical Biology, University of Vienna; and 
the editor-in-chief of the journal Biological Theory: 
Integrating Development, Evolution, and Cognition.
Editors’ note: In the course of preparing this 
commentary Werner Callebaut unexpectedly passed 
away before he could attend to the final proofs. We very 
much regret this loss for the scientific community.
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Ascending to the Second-
Order: An Alternative Systems 
take on Wicked Problems
Steve Fuller
University of Warwick, UK 
s.w.fuller/at/warwick.ac.uk
> upshot • Contrary to Alrøe and Noe, 
problems are wicked not because they 
escape the technical expertise of the spe-
cial sciences but because they reawaken 
the sciences’ totalizing impulse, which 
then leads to conflicting cross-disciplin-
ary claims, on the basis of which the state 
must intervene. This situation is under-
standable against the backdrop of an 
“open systems” perspective, in which the 
sort of second-order perspective presup-
posed by wicked problems is spontane-
ously generated.
« 1 » Perhaps the most curious feature of 
Hugo alrøe and Egon Noe’s target article is 
its failure to define conditions that within a 
systems-theoretic perspective permit the or-
ganization of different disciplinary perspec-
tives into a second-order, “polyocular” vision 
capable of addressing “wicked problems.” 
These problems can be defined as ones of 
great societal import but that, due their com-
plexity, lack a natural disciplinary home. In-
stead, despite the article’s systems-theoretic 
talk, polyocular vision is presented as an ad 
hoc construction, which takes for granted 
the existence of well-bounded disciplines, an 
amorphous problem space and some undis-
closed agency with the power to bring these 
disciplines to bear on the problem space, 
resulting in the vaunted “polyocular vision.” 
Most of the paper is spent describing poly-
ocular vision as an outgrowth of certain “per-
spectivalist” tendencies in recent analytic 
philosophy of science against the backdrop 
of a broadly Kuhnian account of disciplines 
as paradigms. as a result, the exact sense of 
key terms such as “system” and “problem” 
remain unclear. In what follows, I elaborate 
these concerns by offering an alternative ac-
count of the issue that the authors claim to 
be addressing.
« 2 » to their credit, alrøe and Noe 
admit that the phrase “wicked problems” 
is a misnomer because they are not really 
“problems” in the strict sense. a problem 
presupposes recognized constraints on per-
missible solutions. The pragmatists, notably 
John dewey, were clear that the relevant con-
straints are provided by life processes, whose 
problematic character we discover as the re-
sistance we (individually or collectively) face 
in the course of trying to achieve some goal. 
In this respect, there is no single solution to 
“the problem of justice” in the philosophical 
sense, because each society brings a different 
set of resources and constraints (“affordances 
and resistances”) into the situation. But this 
does not necessarily render the problem of 
justice “makeshift” (i.e., each society arrives 
at its own solution, reflecting its unique cir-
cumstances). It does, however, raise interest-
ing questions about what might constitute 
an “optimal solution” with any degree of 
generality, since the amount and nature of 
constraints and resources available in spe-
cific cases influence how possible solutions 
are judged. algebra comes in handy for stuff 
like this – namely, the representation of func-
tional relations in conditions of great vari-
ability. Here one might have recourse to what 
economists call “theories of the second best,” 
which particular cases force a re-ordering of 
priorities (or re-weighting of values) because 
of radically changed circumstances (Lipsey & 
Lancester 1956). a simple example is that in 
times of war, minimizing harm may be low-
ered as a policy priority vis-à-vis the main-
tenance of social order due to the external 
threat, thereby influencing judgements about 
what to count as a “just policy.”
« 3 » In this respect, the identification 
and solution of problems constitute the 
epistemological trace of ordinary biological 
survival. They mark the moments when the 
organism distinguishes itself from its envi-
ronment. Herbert simon (1977) famously 
spoke of “satisficing” as the second-order 
goal of all problem solving, i.e., an organism’s 
self-understanding grows as it adopts solu-
tions that allow it to solve more problems in 
the future. However, “problems” in this sense 
are not “wicked,” because they actually help 
to craft the organism’s identity. In contrast, at 
least according to alrøe and Noe, a “wicked 
problem” escapes the established self-under-
standings of several (disciplinary) organ-
isms. such a problem would seem to enjoy an 
autonomous existence, one independent of 
any particular framing. Thus, “global warm-
ing” is presumed to be problematic even if it 
does not pose a palpable threat to anyone’s 
life or, for that matter, does not register as 
a technical puzzle in some related scientific 
discipline. Yet, for the classical tradition in 
the philosophy of science that extends from 
the logical positivists to Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn and their followers, the recognition of 
problems is constrained by a theoretical and 
methodological framework explicitly im-
posed on the world.
« 4 » to be sure, these philosophers 
specified the relevant constraints differently, 
not least whether they are borne by an indi-
vidual or a collective – all of which are put 
to one side for purposes of this discussion. 
Nevertheless, they concurred that “science” 
in the proper sense requires sufficient con-
trol over the operable environment to en-
able agreement on whether, say, a particular 
experiment did or did not vindicate a par-
ticular hypothesis. (of course, diagnoses and 
follow up actions may then vary.) It is from 
this general standpoint that alrøe and Noe’s 
conception of “wicked problems” begins to 
make sense, namely, as belonging to aspects 
of experiential reality that remain unconcep-
tualized – and in that sense, “unproblema-
tized” – by the current scientific paradigms. 
Moreover, there is precedent for dealing with 
“wicked problems” in this sense, most no-
tably the German “finalization” movement, 
which called for state science policy agencies 
to divert the energies of “mature sciences” 
from solving technical puzzles in their own 
fields to jointly tackling complex societal 
problems, broadly covering the biomedical 
and environmental fields (schaeffer 1984). 
The historical specificity of this development 
is worth recalling. When Patrick suppes 
(1978) complained at the height of the Cold 
War that Kuhn was all too correct – namely, 
that increasingly divergent disciplinary tra-
jectories were turning any hope of scientific 
unification into a lost cause – the state was 
by far the main funder of scientific research, 
and hence arguably enjoyed a prerogative to 
steer the science that it funded in more so-
cially beneficial directions, à la finalization. 
The last great effort in this vein may be the 
“converging technologies” agenda launched 
by the us National science Foundation in 
2002, soon followed by a similar European 
union initiative, which proposes to harness 
nano-, bio-, cogno-, info- (and now neuro-) 
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sciences and technologies to “enhance hu-
man performance” (Fuller 2011: chap. 3).
« 5 » The main objection to finalization, 
both in its own day and today, is its apparent 
willingness to compromise the integrity of 
free inquiry in the name of some politically 
defined ends. However, there is a deeper ob-
jection. This general way of understanding 
the history of science, especially the expec-
tation that some external agency – the state, 
in this case – will force otherwise wayward 
disciplines to work together to address free-
standing social problems. It is an artefact of 
a certain vision of the history, namely, one of 
gradual specialisation from an initially un-
differentiated spirit of inquiry, which is typi-
cally associated with philosophy. However, 
another way to read the same history, which 
was more prominent in the 19th century, 
when disciplinary specialisation began to be 
institutionalised in university departments, 
is that what we now call “disciplines” started 
life as totalising world views (“mechanism,” 
“vitalism,” etc.). These world views, through 
various confrontations with each other and 
the larger non-academic world, retreated to 
their current disciplinary boundaries – in 
different configurations, in different uni-
versities. From this standpoint, “wicked 
problems” reawaken this totalitarian spirit, 
as each discipline then tries to colonize a 
domain from its own perspective. Note that 
the role of philosophy is thus different in the 
two cases: instead of providing a primordial 
“confused” source of ideas that is then “clari-
fied” by the special disciplines, this “deviant” 
reading of the history suggests that philoso-
phy is better understood as common intel-
lectual inheritance, subject to multiple in-
vestment strategies (aka the special sciences) 
that nevertheless remain in touch with the 
original philosophical drive toward universal 
knowledge (Fuller 2010).
« 6 » In terms of alrøe and Noe’s quest 
for a second-order systems-based perspec-
tive, this deviant reading of the history of 
science implies that disciplines spontane-
ously generate their own second-order vi-
sions when encountering domains of reality 
currently outside their remit. science and 
technology studies provides one interesting 
way to understand this matter. If one takes 
seriously what I earlier called “the classical 
philosophy of science tradition,” it is unclear 
how to establish the relevance of phenomena 
generated in the artificial setting of the labo-
ratory to the world outside its walls. While 
psychologists had long made this matter 
central to research methodology under the 
rubric of “external validity,” it was only in the 
late 1970s that sociologists of science such as 
Michael Mulkay, Karin Knorr-Cetina and es-
pecially Bruno Latour, charted how relatively 
rarefied lab moments could have enormous 
extramural consequences – to the point that 
they come to be recognized as having solved 
problems of interest not merely to scientists 
but to society at large (Fuller 1993). The gen-
eral drift of this work is that science coloniz-
es the public sphere through various forms of 
network-building, such that people come to 
identify with the scientific world-view. Thus, 
they presume that solutions to scientifically 
defined problems solve their personal prob-
lems as well. Latour (1988) held up Louis 
Pasteur as a spectacularly successful version 
of this strategy in the Third French Republic.
« 7 » to set the stage for what “wicked-
ness” might mean in terms of this revised 
understanding, a couple of observations are 
in order, which are best made by focusing 
on Latour’s account of Pasteur. to start, it is 
notably at odds with the influential us sci-
ence policy account given by donald stokes 
(1997), for whom Pasteur exemplifies re-
search based on industrial and health policy 
concerns (in this case, the deterioration of 
wine, beer and milk) that ended up having 
far reaching consequences for fundamental 
research (namely, the science of microbiol-
ogy). However, stokes’s perspective fails to 
explain how Pasteur managed to persuade 
rather differently situated parties to adopt 
solutions that, notwithstanding their practi-
cal intent, had been crafted in specific labo-
ratory settings. Here the appeal to “science,” 
as the brand under which Pasteur’s experi-
ments travelled, served a persuasive func-
tion that might be otherwise matched only 
by political coercion. The difference between 
stokes’s and Latour’s accounts is that stokes 
takes for granted the basic-applied research 
distinction, whereas Latour does not – in 
fact, Pasteur’s intervention turns out to be 
instrumental in constructing the distinction.
« 8 » at the same time, Latour’s basic 
idea that Pasteur forged a network rather 
than a system challenges a signature inno-
vation of systems theory, which originally 
attempted to provide a dynamic solution to 
the metaphysical problem of “mereology,” 
that is, the whole-part relation. Based on his 
understanding of biology, Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy translated this problem into one of 
an organism including aspects of its environ-
ment into its own normal functions, thereby 
extending its “system boundary” (strijbos 
2010). In this respect, organizational com-
plexity – evidenced by functional differ-
entiation – may be seen as an internalized 
version of the variety of external challenges 
that an organism faces in realizing its objec-
tives. such latter-day ideas as the “extended 
phenotype” (dawkins 1982) and “extended 
mind” (Clark 2008) are worthy descendants 
of this tradition, which treats the organism 
as an “open system.” The sociological trace is 
provided by the history of the universitas, the 
Roman legal entity translated as “corpora-
tion,” which includes all autonomous collec-
tives from cities and firms to universities and 
churches that flourish by growing through 
“incorporation.” But this venerable tradition 
of systems-thinking, with which I have been 
broadly sympathetic from the start of social 
epistemology (Fuller 1988), presupposes a 
sense of overriding purpose that continues 
to stabilize the (social) organism’s identity as 
it engages in its various transactions with the 
environment.
« 9 » However, Latour’s counter-image 
of the network is meant to be something 
quite different – namely, a redistribution of 
significance across the system parts (now 
called “network nodes”) in the course of its 
growth, resulting in an entity whose orien-
tation is fundamentally different from its 
previous incarnations. Put concretely: an 
unintended consequence of Pasteur’s success 
in persuading people to adopt his science-
based policies for extending the longevity 
of wine, beer and milk is that they became 
stakeholders in the “pasteurization” process, 
at which point the science was no longer 
exclusively – or perhaps even primarily – 
in the hands of the scientists. at that point, 
Pasteur’s project was no longer about science 
colonizing a feature of public life; rather, it 
was about science’s contribution to a rise in 
the default standard of society’s collective 
intelligence. as a result, the role of scientific 
authorities would be invariably diminished, 
reduced to prominent nodes in an indefinite 
network – as opposed to nerve centres of a 
well-bounded system.
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« 10 » The following summarizes the pre-
ceding line of reasoning as a series of proposi-
tions in support of an argument:
  Contra alrøe and Noe, “wicked prob-
lems” are not artefacts of the narrowness 
of scientific paradigms vis-à-vis real 
world problems, which requires state in-
tervention for the problems to be treated 
adequately.
  on the contrary, what makes such al-
røe and Noe’s problems “wicked” is that 
they reawaken the sciences’ totalizing 
impulse – a legacy of their philosophical 
origins – which then leads to conflicting 
cross-disciplinary claims, on the basis of 
which the state must intervene.
  The emergence of this state-of-affairs is 
understandable against the backdrop of 
a systems-theoretic conception of “open 
systems.” It amounts to a spontaneous 
generation of second-order perspectives 
in the process of system boundary ex-
tension.
  Moreover, to simplify matters, the state’s 
legitimacy is granted – perhaps grudg-
ingly – as a fair arbiter of these contest-
ing second-order perspectival claims.
  However, science and technology stud-
ies, especially Latour’s work, offers an 
alternative take on what such a resolu-
tion might look like. Instead of one or 
more sciences colonizing a previously 
“undisciplined” domain, solutions to 
wicked problems may end up forcing 
the sciences to cede some of their epis-
temic authority in exchange for stabiliz-
ing their position in society at large.
  In light of this alternative resolution of 
wicked problems, the sciences are then 
forced to redefine themselves as either 
systems or networks. The more that sci-
ence agrees to the network-based self-un-
derstanding, the greater science’s struggle 
to define its own epistemic distinctive-
ness (aka system boundary) in society.
Steve Fuller is Auguste Comte Professor of Social 
Epistemology at the University of Warwick, UK. Trained in 
history and philosophy of science, Fuller is best known for 
his foundational work in the field of social epistemology. 
He has recently completed a trilogy relating to the 
idea of a “post-” or “trans-” human future.
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What is “Science”? For 
What do We need a 
“Polyocular Framework”?
Michael H. G. Hoffmann
Georgia Institute of Technology, USA 
m.hoffmann/at/gatech.edu
> upshot • Alrøe and Noe are right in ad-
dressing Rittel and Webber’s notion of 
“wicked problems” as crucial for inter-
disciplinary research. However, I cannot 
see that they are providing a sufficiently 
clear understanding of “science” in their 
concept of a “second-order science of in-
terdisciplinary research,” nor that their 
“polyocular framework” can contribute 
anything useful to addressing the prac-
tical challenges posed by wicked prob-
lems.
« 1 » When Horst Rittel and Melvin 
Webber introduced the extraordinarily in-
fluential concept of “wicked problems” in 
1973, they already indicated that one of the 
most important features of these problems is 
that they can be described from a multitude 
of different perspectives. The first of the ten 
defining characteristics of a wicked problem 
is, according to them: “There is no definitive 
formulation of a wicked problem” (Rittel & 
Webber 1973: 161). Instead, there is a mul-
titude of possible ways to describe a wicked 
problem or to formulate what the problem 
is. The reason they provide for this feature of 
wicked problems is that “every specification 
of the problem is a specification of the di-
rection in which a treatment is considered.” 
They illustrate what they conceive as the 
identity of problem formulation and envi-
sioning of a solution by referring to poverty 
as a wicked problem:
“ does poverty mean low income? Yes, in part. 
But what are the determinants of low income? Is 
it deficiency of the national and regional econo-
mies, or is it deficiencies of cognitive and occu-
pational skills within the labor force? If the latter, 
the problem statement and the problem ‘solution’ 
must encompass the educational processes. But, 
then, where within the educational system does 
the real problem lie? What then might it mean 
to ‘improve the educational system’? or does the 
poverty problem reside in deficient physical and 
mental health? If so, we must add those etiologies 
to our information package, and search inside 
the health services for a plausible cause. does it 
include cultural deprivation? spatial dislocation? 
problems of ego identity? deficient political and 
social skills? – and so on. If we can formulate the 
problem by tracing it to some sorts of sources – 
such that we can say, ‘aha! That’s the locus of the 
difficulty,’ i.e., those are the root causes of the dif-
ferences between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought to be’ con-
ditions – then we have thereby also formulated 
a solution. to find the problem is thus the same 
thing as finding the solution; the problem can’t be 
defined until the solution has been found.” (Rit-
tel & Webber 1973: 161)
« 2 » since wicked problems allow a 
multitude of different approaches that might 
contribute to their solution, the identity of 
problem formulation and of conceiving a 
solution implies that there will be a multi-
tude of possible problem formulations.
« 3 » Thus, it seems to be clear that Rit-
tel and Webber already have in mind what 
Hugo alrøe and Egon Noe call in the target 
article a “polyocular framework for wicked 
problems,” even though they do not use the 
term (nor something more colloquial such 
as “multi-perspectival”). This becomes vis-
ible in the fact that Rittel and Webber wrote, 
in 1973, that wicked problems should be ap-
proached…
“ based on a model of planning as an argumenta-
tive process in the course of which an image of the 
problem and of the solution emerges gradually 
among the participants, as a product of incessant 
judgment, subjected to critical argument.” (Rit-
tel & Webber 1973: 162)
« 4 » alrøe and Noe do an excellent job 
of connecting the idea of the insufficiency of 
particular perspectives with Ronald Giere’s 
“scientific perspectivism” and related dis-
cussions in philosophy of science. However, 
their most original contribution to perspec-
tivity in general and research on interdis-
ciplinarity in particular seems to be their 
claim that we need what they call a “second-
order science of interdisciplinary research.” 
Now, even though I agree with much in the 
article, I see two major problems that de-
serve, I think, further consideration.
« 5 » First, I am struggling to get an 
appropriate understanding of what this 
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“second-order science of interdisciplinary 
research” exactly is. Why is this supposed to 
be a “science”? Is it a “science” in the sense 
of an institution, as indicated by describ-
ing the “second-order scientific perspec-
tive” as an “autopoietic social system” with 
“its own organization” (§45)? should there 
be departments of “second-order science of 
interdisciplinary research,” corresponding 
science organizations with journals, and so 
on? or at least a clearly identifiable, inter-
disciplinary research community as we find, 
for example, in the newly developed “sci-
ence of team science” (Börner et al. 2010)? 
or is an institutional approach to “science” 
misleading, and should it be replaced by 
an understanding of science as a corpus of 
knowledge? I would be perfectly happy with 
a second-order “approach” to the problem 
of perspectivity, but I do not know what it 
means to discuss this as a “science.” an “ap-
proach” would shift the focus from institu-
tions and bodies of knowledge to a specific 
method – a “way,” as the Greek met-hodos 
indicates, to deal with the problem that no 
particular perspective is sufficient to deal 
adequately with wicked problems.
« 6 » Even though a second-order “ap-
proach” to interdisciplinarity would indicate 
that wicked problems require us somehow 
to overcome the limitations of first-order, 
disciplinary perspectives, it still does not 
tell us what that exactly means. It seems 
to be clear that an answer to this question 
requires the formulation of fulfillment con-
ditions. We need to know what it takes to 
distinguish a second-order approach from 
any other approach that tries to overcome 
first-order limitations. For example, do we 
already have second-order science of inter-
disciplinarity when we – trained in a spe-
cific but limited discipline – try to learn the 
language of another discipline? do we have 
second-order science of interdisciplinarity 
when we conceive the wicked problem as 
a “boundary object” in the sense of star & 
Griesemer (1989) that we approach by the 
disciplinary means that are available to us, 
and that we then simply send over to the ex-
perts of another discipline, hoping that the 
overall process will make sense even if we 
are not able to see it? or does the charac-
terization of “second-order science” require 
some sort of integration of a multitude of 
different perspectives?
« 7 » This last question leads directly to 
my second, more important problem. What 
exactly can be achieved by the proposed 
“polyocular framework”? For what can it be 
used?
« 8 » alrøe and Noe provide the follow-
ing definition (§17):
“ The term ‘polyocular’ has been construct-
ed in analogy with binocular and monocular 
(Maruyama 1974), and here ‘ocular’ is used in 
nearly the same sense as perspective, but with a 
built-in social systems theoretical meaning in the 
form of the ‘blind spot’ of an eye (Latin: oculus).”
Thus, given that the Greek polus means 
“many,” “polyocular” seems to stand for 
“multiperspectival, but in a way that each 
particular perspective leaves a blind spot.” I 
hope this is indeed the intended definition. 
But what can we do with such a “polyocu-
lar framework”? How can it help us to cope 
with wicked problems?
« 9 » unfortunately, I cannot see that 
this concept contributes anything to the 
very concrete challenge that is posed by 
wicked problems. The reason for this frus-
tration of my expectation is that alrøe and 
Noe’s “three pivotal phases of a polyocular 
research project” as they are outlined in 
table 1 of the target article (§58) only lead 
– on the level of interdisciplinarity – to what 
they call “polyocular understanding,” a term 
that is somewhat further illuminated by 
the phrase “addressing the plethora of so-
lutions.” What does it mean to “address” a 
plethora of solutions? The elaboration of this 
phrase in §66 does not contribute much to a 
better understanding:
“ The third phase of polyocular research ad-
dresses the plethora of solutions offered by the 
perspectives involved. Polyocular understanding 
– the multidimensional space of understanding 
that can be established through polyocular ob-
servation and communication of the perspectival 
observations in Phase 2 – forms the basis for a 
shared or coordinated effort to instigating change 
and transformation.”
« 10 » already Rittel and Webber made 
clear in their seminal paper that the many 
perspectives from which a wicked problem 
can be observed need to be addressed. But 
the crucial question is obviously not that 
many perspectives should be addressed, 
but how a shared, coordinated, or integrated 
perspective can be achieved. Rittel and Web-
ber themselves suggested, as quoted above 
in §3, an “argumentative process” in which 
a solution might emerge “gradually.” This is 
an approach to solving wicked problems by 
integrating a multitude of perspectives in 
practice, an approach that I developed fur-
ther in my own work (Hoffmann & Boren-
stein 2014).
« 11 » There are some indications – even 
though, again, not clearly enough articu-
lated – that alrøe and Noe seem to assume 
that such a shared, coordinated, or inte-
grated perspective is, first, not possible and 
should, second, not even be attempted. at 
one point (§12) they write – without say-
ing explicitly whether this is their position 
or just the one that results from the position 
discussed in this context: “different scientific 
perspectives see complex matters differently, 
and these differences cannot, and should 
not, be merged.” If this is indeed true, why 
should we engage in any polyocular research 
project? If first-order perspectives can never 
be merged, how should we ever be able to 
cope with wicked problems? We can talk 
forever about the multitude of perspec-
tives that come into play when we want to 
build a highway – an example used by Rittel 
and Webber. But at the end of the day there 
needs to be a decision: should it be built or 
not? Wicked problems are not important be-
cause they can be addressed forever, but be-
cause they need a decision, and because any 
decision seems to be impossible to justify. 
all this makes me sceptical about how al-
røe and Noe’s “polyocular framework” could 
help to make good decisions when facing 
wicked problems.
Michael hoffmann is an Associate Professor 
for Philosophy in the School of Public Policy at 
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of diagrammatic representations for cognitive 
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What Kind of Autopoietic 
System, If Any, Can a 
Perspective Actually Be?
Robert Drury King
Sierra Nevada College, USA 
rking/at/sierranevada.edu
> upshot • The authors propose that a 
perspective is an autopoietic system. 
This commentary challenges the feasi-
bility of this claim by pointing out the 
conceptual difficulties associated with 
such a proposal. But even granting that 
a perspective is, or can be, an autopoietic 
system, what sort of autopoietic system 
might best ground the authors’ concept 
of perspective? This last question is also 
pursued here.
« 1 » Hugo alrøe and Egon Noe’s paper 
poses an intriguing philosophical claim: a 
perspective, scientific or – presumably – 
otherwise, is an autopoietic system. The au-
thors claim:
“ [a] scientific perspective is thus an autopoietic 
system that is reproduced and refined through in-
ternal processes […], and which produces its own 
methods, theories and instruments for observa-
tion, and thereby also its own inputs (data).” 
(§18).
Yet one might have strong reservations 
against this view. to assign the properties of 
autopoietic systems to a (scientific) perspec-
tive would be to assign rather robust prop-
erties indeed to a perspective. does the au-
thors’ definition of perspective stand up to 
the sort of robust demands that are put upon 
(the structural properties and dynamics of) 
autopoietic systems?
« 2 » Let us clarify the terms. The au-
thors’ definition of perspective is “that 
which determines what an observer can 
observe and what it cannot observe” (§17). 
But autopoietic systems contain more bells 
and whistles than this property that the 
authors attribute to perspective here; for 
instance, autopoietic systems have a com-
plex structural dynamics. First, even grant-
ing that autopoietic systems play a strong 
role in determining what observers can and 
cannot observe, we must ask if the particu-
lar structural dynamics possessed by auto-
poietic systems provide a reasonable or sat-
isfactory model for conceiving perspective, 
but also, more deeply and more broadly, we 
must ask if autopoietic systems provide a 
viable model for analyzing the determining 
dynamics of polyocular research (a com-
bination vis-à-vis a non-unifiable plural-
ity or asymmetrical synthesis of multiple 
perspectives), within which the concept of 
perspective is supposed to be cashed out 
by these authors. Complimentary ques-
tions then arise: what can polyocular re-
search observe/not observe? (I think this 
first question is treated with some justice 
by the authors); and how can polyocular re-
search observe/not observe? Here, I think 
the authors might do well to address this 
question in more depth. Further, do non-
autopoietic elements not themselves play a 
non-negligible or even strong determining 
role in producing what a (partially blind) 
perspective can and cannot observe? If so, 
what might these non-autopoietic elements 
be?
« 3 » These last questions are of tremen-
dous importance. They imply a whole host 
of theoretical commitments and presuppo-
sitions. This is complicated further by the 
fact that there is a surprisingly wide breadth 
of autopoietic theories (including social au-
topoietic theories). What concept of auto-
poietic system is the key reference for these 
authors? This is not stated outright; instead 
a range of influences are listed – but differ-
ences matter. More significantly, a formal or 
consistent definition of autopoietic system 
is not offered by the authors. The concep-
tual differences in the variety of autopoietic 
systems theories are sometimes intractable. 
They certainly were for Niklas Luhmann, 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco va-
rela, which references we, for the space of 
this commentary, focus on to the exclusion 
of the authors’ other references. such a re-
duction is not too drastic since Luhmann is 
one of the authors’ key references and since 
Luhmann (1992: 70) explicitly borrows his 
theory of autopoiesis from Maturana and 
varela, combining it uniquely with George 
spencer Brown’s laws of form, but main-
taining Maturana and varela’s core concepts 
(operational closure, boundary, system/en-
vironment) while adapting these concepts 
to his own research program.
« 4 » While Maturana and varela’s ca-
nonical formulations concerning autopoiet-
ic systems make it clear that the dynamics of 
autopoietic systems play a role in determin-
ing what an observer can and cannot see, 
this fact is not enough to make the stronger 
claim that autopoietic systems offer a good 
ontological or epistemological basis for 
alrøe and Noe’s definition of perspective, 
which seems a bit too limited in scope and 
generic in nature. Yet these authors claim to 
wish only to illuminate perspective by draw-
ing on analogy with autopoietic systems. But 
how far should one take this analogy? again, 
should we assume that perspective, like an 
autopoietic system, is also endowed with the 
property of operational closure? Moreover, 
for Maturana and varela, autopoietic sys-
tems do not strictly determine perspectives, 
even if they can be said to ground them; they 
merely reproduce themselves by reproduc-
ing their own parts in operationally closed 
networks of system dynamics according to 
that system’s structure (at any time under 
analysis of the operations in question) (Mat-
urana & varela 1980: 78). do perspectives 
possess the same sort of structure-deter-
mined dynamics, or is this just an analogy? 
If the latter, where to draw the line between 
the relative likeness and unlikeness of auto-
poietic systems and perspectives, viz., the 
structural dynamics at play in the work per-
formed by a perspective (the work, namely, 
of generating through some combination 
or asymmetrical synthesis the polyocular-
ity the authors prize)? as John Mingers puts 
the problem,
“ [i]f the idea of autopoiesis is just used meta-
phorically […] then the only question is its fruit-
fulness, but if it is claimed that a society or orga-
nization is autopoietic then significant ontological 
problems are raised.” (Mingers 2004: 405f)
Luhmann, for example, borrows the basic 
definition of autopoiesis from Maturana and 
varela, but will generalize the results of this 
research in an application to social systems, 
which move has been highly scrutinized. 
This high level of scrutiny is owed to the fact 
that it is difficult to tell what the elements 
of a social system actually are, and it is dif-
ficult to tell whether social systems main-
tain the sorts of boundary conditions that 
autopoietic systems do. But the authors do 
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not include a discussion of the differences 
between these two conceptions or remark at 
due length upon the epistemological prob-
lems associated with Luhmann’s generaliza-
tion. They might have spent greater effort on 
this endeavor.
« 5 »  so to recast a criticism: what au-
topoietic system conception do the authors 
have in mind when defining perspective or 
when claiming that social systems are auto-
poietic? and more importantly, which suite 
of autopoietic properties do they wish to at-
tribute to perspective, observer, observation 
and polyocularity more generally? There 
may be a fair amount of undue equivocation 
in the authors’ summary detailing of con-
ceptual resources concerning these terms 
(autopoietic system, perspective, etc.).
« 6 » We might ask the authors if per-
spectives reproduce themselves by repro-
ducing their own parts in virtue of their op-
erational closure, following Maturana and 
varela, as well as Luhmann. Yet we have a 
tough time imagining the authors answer-
ing in the affirmative because this seems a 
tricky claim to wish to endorse. For one, it 
leaves one wondering what serves the role of 
generating second-order observation. tak-
ing the authors at their word, perspective 
seems to play a foundational role for first-
order observation (though the observation 
one attains via perspective varies by social 
system). Perspective presupposes, rightly in 
the constructivist and radical constructiv-
ist traditions, a blind-spot ontology, but the 
authors leave open the question of what it 
is that synthesizes first-order observations 
into something adequately polyocular. Is 
it the autopoietic system, defined in Mat-
urana’s terms? Is it the social system (of 
science), defined in Luhmannian terms? 
Not knowing what type of autopoietic sys-
tem performs this work leaves some thorny 
philosophical problems to address. Might 
it even be the case that a non-autopoietic, 
i.e., human synthetic, agent observes the 
observations? Well, the problem with this 
common-sense solution to the problem is 
that answering in the affirmative deprives 
readers of determining just what it is that is 
autopoietic about polyocular research. after 
all, for Maturana, it is unclear that human 
beings are autopoietic, while human social 
systems are not; and humans, in social sys-
tems, are also not autopoietic for Maturana 
(Koskinen 2013: 46). If anything, humans 
merely realize their (molecular or biologi-
cal) autopoiesis through languaging in the 
social medium (ibid). Luhmann, too, was 
at pains to substitute out the human agent 
from his reflection on social systems.
« 7 » But while the authors do not here 
argue definitively for some human agent 
that would deliver polyocularity, it is less 
clear just what does perform the work of 
moving from first-order to second-order 
observation (and from there to a polyocular 
research framework). They write:
“ In a perspectivist view, science is observer-
dependent to the core, and we see a growing 
recognition in science studies that all scientific 
knowledge is perspectival; i.e., that the context 
established by a scientific discipline is decisive 
for the kind of observations that can be made by 
that discipline. This development is connected to 
the development of radical constructivism, which 
suggests that we, including science, actively con-
struct our world and that deeper insights in the 
knowledge constructions of science can be gained 
from cognitive sciences […]” (§9)
« 8 » But who or what is this “we”? Read-
ers are initially led to believe that the work 
of perspective is undertaken by autopoietic 
systems and, presumably, their structural 
dynamics. do autopoietic systems comprise 
the sort of “we” to whom the authors would 
feel comfortable ascribing knowledge con-
structions? But again, and more crucially, 
which, and whose, theory of autopoiesis are 
the authors talking about?
« 9 » Not sorting such issues out quickly 
bleeds into other curiosities in this other-
wise compelling and original (where appli-
cations to wicked problems are concerned) 
research article. For instance, for Maturana, 
autopoietic systems are living systems; they 
are molecular/biological beings in essence 
(this was one of the reason he resisted call-
ing society autopoietic: society does not 
contain living, biological, hence, autopoietic 
elements). Maturana has held steadfastly to 
this claim and has been at pains to clarify 
that social systems are not autopoietic sys-
tems (a position that he has softened over 
the years, but a definition against which he 
has maintained a great deal of skepticism). 
This fact might also put the authors’ reliance 
on Maturana and varela (the extent of this 
reliance is admittedly ill-defined, but this ac-
tually ramifies the problems addressed here) 
at odds with Maturana’s own proposals for 
autopoietic systems, since, the authors say: 
“[t]he perspectives that we are mainly con-
cerned with in this article are scientific per-
spectives, and the observers we look at are 
social systems” (§17). Yet what if observers/
social systems are not properly autopoietic, 
following Maturana (including his early 
work with varela)? to sort out this difficul-
ty, the authors’ ought at least to be clearer 
about how they distinguish Luhmann from 
Maturana (and varela), again, since Luh-
mann has consistently identified with the 
conceptual underpinnings of their model 
of autopoietic systems. In sum, these finer 
points matter quite a bit because the authors 
tie perspective to autopoietic systems very 
tightly (while perspective is tied, in turn, 
very tightly to their concepts of observers 
and observation).
« 10 » Recall that, for the authors, a “sci-
entific perspective is an autopoietic system 
that […] produces […] its own instruments 
for observation” (§18). It does appear, how-
ever, that the authors take a stronger turn to 
Luhmannian conceptual resources (despite 
the fact that these are difficult indeed to sep-
arate out from the Maturanian and early va-
relian influences) and they do this, it seems, 
because for Luhmann, the properties of au-
topoietic systems actually can be assigned 
or generalized to social systems. Thus, on 
Luhmannian terms, it is possible to speak 
of a scientific discourse (set of distinctions) 
or community of observers autopoietically 
generating its own modes of observation. 
But identifying strongly with Luhmann here 
raises the question of just how it is that the 
authors really benefit by tying their concep-
tion of perspective to the autopoietic model 
of Maturana and varela, vis-à-vis Luhmann. 
again, the authors’ use of the autopoietic 
model does not appear to reside in Matura-
na and varela’s characterization of autopoi-
etic structural dynamics (based as they are 
on structure-determined, living, autopoietic 
systems under operational closure). I think 
the authors’ best defense here is to declare 
that their reliance on Maturana and varela 
is of the nature of a passing interest in an 
important conceptual precursor, and then to 
strengthen their account of how it is that a 
particularly Luhmannian social system can 
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constitute a perspective over and against the 
Maturanian and varelian account. and to 
an extent, they do make this move. But clari-
fying the conceptual lines of departure be-
tween Maturana and varela and Luhmann 
(ignoring the other references to autopoietic 
systems theory-types) would do the paper 
good.
« 11 » In sum:
1 | there remains a skepticism that a per-
spective is (or can be) an autopoietic 
system. There remains a lack of con-
ceptual clarity concerning what sort of 
autopoietic system the authors have in 
mind such that they do not, in the end, 
adequately predicate the subject of their 
key claim (“a perspective is an autopoi-
etic system”) or provide the essential 
conceptual markers to distinguish a per-
haps more Luhmannian version of so-
cial systems from its roots in Maturana 
and varela’s essential insights;
2 | there remains skepticism that autopoi-
etic systems, even Luhmannian, might 
actually stand as a viable ground (onto-
logical or epistemological) for a perspec-
tive (what is the ontology, for example, 
that supports the claim that “a perspec-
tive is an autopoietic system”?);
3 | there remains a skepticism that the dy-
namics of autopoietic systems actually 
do a sufficient job of supporting the no-
tion of perspective and polyocularity 
that the authors’ champion.
« 12 » Let us recall that for Maturana 
(and the early varela), autopoietic systems 
are structurally open precisely as a conse-
quence of their operational closure. are 
perspectives operationally closed and au-
tonomous because operationally closed? 
In a perspective, what operations are re-
cursively generated in scientific systems? 
For a perspective to qualify as autopoietic, 
would it not have to be autonomous? But 
then what is the basis (some act of synthetic, 
if asymmetrical, or combinatory logic, …
or otherwise) for a polyocular scientific in-
terdisciplinary research program capable 
of addressing wicked problems? This basis 
must lie in some synthetic agent compiling 
together – even if in a plurality that never 
reaches a unity – the first-order observa-
tions. But who or what does the synthesis of 
the multiple first-order observations? Who 
or what observes the observations? It seems 
that perspectives, left alone, could not do 
this kind of heavy lifting, since they are the 
constitutive pre-condition of first-order ob-
servations.
« 13 » Recall that the authors say, “[t]he 
only access for interdisciplinary science to 
studying a complex problem or complex 
phenomenon is through the (first-order) sci-
entific perspectives that enter into the study” 
(§23). We know that the authors’ answer to 
the question of how to generate polyocular-
ity out of first-order perspectives lies in a 
reliance on the notion that perspectives be-
long to social systems, which are, for the au-
thors, in fact autopoietic. The problem with 
leaving the answer at this level of generality, 
without specification of the dynamics of the 
autopoiesis, is that it prefigures results that 
are, in turn, a touch generic. Furthermore, 
in Maturana and varela’s framework of au-
topoiesis, changes in the structure of an au-
topoietic system emerge from external trig-
gers and structural coupling. do the author’s 
maintain that the move from first-order ob-
servations to polyocularity is a result of trig-
gers and structural coupling? It seems not. 
The move to a Luhmannian model, where 
the social processes of autopoietic systems 
are to account for (polyocular) communica-
tions, seems equally unsatisfactory, mainly 
because the authors do not specify the auto-
poietic dynamics through which first-order 
perspectives might, as communications, 
generate polyocularity. to be sure, the au-
thors do suggest that it is the social system of 
scientific observers, observing their first or-
der observations, that serves as a precondi-
tion for generating the second-order obser-
vations capable of generating polyocularity. 
But what if, as Maturana declares, autopoiet-
ic systems are of a different order of systems 
than social systems such that autopoietic 
systems do not actually maintain the power 
of synthesis that would be required to gen-
erate second-order observations, but would 
instead require some non-autopoietic, say, 
human, synthetic capacity or some capac-
ity of languaging? If the latter is the case, if 
some human agent or languaging capacity 
must preside over the synthesis of perspec-
tives (note that this synthesis does not imply 
a reduction of perspectives for the authors, 
but only implies the sort of combination that 
yields a viably poly-ocular perspective), then 
why rely on the autopoietic systems theory 
at all? This problem is magnified if, again, 
the human social system is not an autopoi-
etic system in the first place.
« 14 » Finally, in this article the authors 
tend to presuppose the relation between 
perspective and autopoiesis, and so, it must 
follow for them that when the social system 
of science, with its multiple, synchronic per-
spectives, makes an observation, this will 
qualify a-priori as a form of autopoiesis. But 
what, one might ask, are the autopoietic, 
structural dynamics that generate polyocu-
larity? Is there not a conflation of concepts 
here? Thus, some relatively intractable con-
ceptual difficulties emerge in the authors’ ty-
ing together of the concepts of perspective 
and autopoietic system. do these difficulties 
raise significant challenges to the clarity and 
coherence of the polyocular framework and, 
by extension, to its capacity to treat wicked 
problems? It would appear so. But the excit-
ing promise of a polyocular framework for 
wicked problems demands, one would hope, 
that the authors accept the burden of clarify-
ing their concepts.
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Authors’ Response:
A Perspectivist view on 
the Perspectivist view of 
Interdisciplinary Science
Hugo F. Alrøe & Egon Noe
> upshot • In our response we focus on 
five questions that point to important 
common themes in the commentaries: 
why start in wicked problems, what kind 
of system is a scientific perspective, what 
is the nature of second-order research 
processes, what does this mean for un-
derstanding interdisciplinary work, and 
how may polyocular research help make 
real-world decisions.
Introduction
« 1 » The commentaries on our target 
article are very diverse in their standpoint 
and focus. This diversity illustrates a main 
point in the article: perspectives determine 
what observers can and cannot observe 
(§17), and that goes as much for the reading 
of a scholarly article, particularly in an inter-
disciplinary context. some are critical, some 
corroborate and elaborate on the ideas in the 
target article; but despite the diversity, there 
are some common themes running through 
the commentaries. We will focus on those 
in our reply, trying to reinforce some of the 
key points in our article, and hopefully make 
them clearer.
« 2 » The target article takes a perspec-
tivist view of interdisciplinary research. Rick 
Szostak (§13) joins us in “urging a specific 
understanding of ‘interdisciplinarity’ cen-
tred on an appreciation of the importance 
of disciplinary perspective.” Werner Calle-
baut (§4) agrees fully with our perspectiv-
ist grounding, and we agree with him that 
perspectivism is “needed everywhere” as a 
basic epistemological tenet. We do not, any 
more than Callebaut (§6), want to enter into a 
complex discussion here about whether our 
approach is “realist” and in what way, but 
we agree with him that “perspectivism is as 
much realism as you can get” (paraphrasing 
Ronald Giere, see §74). and we can answer 
Callebaut’s question about what we mean by 
constructivism, by saying that we see per-
spectivism as most closely connected to rad-
ical constructivism (as we state in the article, 
§9), and not, e.g., the social constructivism 
that Callebaut mentions.
« 3 » as always in (radical) constructiv-
ist approaches, we cannot, and should not, 
avoid turning perspectivism on itself; we 
need to take a perspectivist approach to the 
perspectivist view of science. When in our 
reply we refer to different perspectives on 
what we are doing, this is therefore not an 
attempt to evade giving a straight answer, 
but an attempt to explain reflectively our 
(perspectivist) approach by including mul-
tiple different perspectives on the topic of 
interdisciplinary research.
« 4 » The themes we address in the fol-
lowing represent the full span of our ap-
proach, from the starting point in wicked 
problems and what kind of system a scientif-
ic perspective is, to the nature of second-or-
der research processes, what this means for 
how interdisciplinary work is understood, 
and how polyocular research may help make 
real-world decisions.
Why take wicked problems 
as a starting point?
« 5 » Steve Fuller and Callebaut are criti-
cal of our starting point in wicked problems, 
whereas Michael hoffmann and Robert drury 
King agree with this starting point while be-
ing critical of other aspects. Fuller (§3) states 
that according to our article a wicked prob-
lem enjoys an autonomous existence, inde-
pendent of whether it threatens anyone or is 
registered by any scientific discipline. This 
is far from our understanding of a wicked 
problem and from how it is described in 
greater detail by hoffmann (§1). Fuller (§7) 
suggests a revised understanding of “wick-
edness,” with reference to Louis Pasteur. 
However, we find that Pasteur is an example 
of a technical problem and a technical so-
lution, rather than a wicked problem. The 
issue is not that wicked problems are inde-
pendent of any particular framing, as Fuller 
puts it, but that “there is no definitive formu-
lation of a wicked problem” because “every 
specification of the problem is a specifica-
tion of the direction in which a treatment 
is considered,” as hoffmann (§1) states, with 
a quote from Horst Rittel & Melvin Webber 
(1973: 161). “to find the problem is thus 
the same thing as finding the solution; the 
problem can’t be defined until the solution 
has been found,” Rittel & Webber write. Yet, 
paradoxically, the solution cannot even be 
sought before some formulation of the prob-
lem has been made, and this paradox adds 
to the wickedness of wicked problems.
« 6 » We agree with Fuller’s (§§5f) devi-
ant standpoint on interdisciplinarity that “it 
is not merely that the normal disciplinarian 
knows more and more about less and less 
but that her very narrowness of vision dis-
torts what she purports to see” (Fuller 2010: 
53). But we do not agree with his ensuing 
argument that:
“ It follows that the deviant tends to treat the 
very presence of different disciplines as prima 
facie pathological, rather like neuroses, which 
Freud treated as mere coping mechanisms for a 
reality we cannot fully manage in its entirety.” 
(ibid)
We see scientific specializations as an inevi-
table consequence of the quest for new in-
sights. The problem is not specialization and 
differentiation in science as such, but how 
we can handle the ensuing increase of com-
plexity. and we see Fuller’s (2010) account 
of different deviant interdisciplinarities as 
examples of new allegedly integrating scien-
tific perspectives that are merely specialized 
in another way than the disciplines they re-
act against. His example of general systems 
theory as “the most ambitious form of devi-
ant interdisciplinarity in recent times” (ibid: 
60) brings this point home.
What kind of (autopoietic) system  
is a scientific perspective?
« 7 » systems theory is sometimes 
posed as a paradigm for interdisciplinary 
science, but there are a range of very differ-
ent systems perspectives that lead to very 
different understandings of the system in 
question and its environment (see, e.g., Noe 
& alrøe 2003, alrøe & Noe 2012). The com-
mentaries illustrate this. Fuller (§8), on one 
hand, is concerned with “open systems,” 
which are dubbed open systems in contra-
diction to the closed systems of classical sci-
ence, focusing on whole-part relations and 
referring to Ludwig von Bertalanffy. King 
(and we), on the other hand, is concerned 
with operationally closed systems, focusing 
on self-organisation, autopoiesis and sys-
tem-environment relations, which provide 
an entirely different take on system bound-
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ary, and referring to the systems theories 
of Humberto Maturana & Francisco varela 
and Niklas Luhmann. Perhaps this differ-
ence is why Fuller (§1) thinks the concept of 
“system” remains unclear in our article, de-
spite our very clear references to the system 
theories we build on, and why he perceives 
polyocular vision as an ad hoc construction 
despite our efforts to substantiate and elabo-
rate the polyocular framework.
« 8 » However, we agree with Fuller’s 
point that network theories are a counter-
image to system theories (§9). We think this 
juxtaposition is even more acute with regard 
to actor-network theory and self-organising 
systems (see, e.g., Noe & alrøe 2006, 2012), 
and we take this as an example of the need 
for multiple perspectives to understand 
complex research objects more fully. Fuller 
further emphasizes that the images of the 
sciences as either systems or networks also 
play a role in the position of science in so-
ciety (§10): “The more that science agrees 
to the network-based self-understanding, 
the greater science’s struggle to define its 
own epistemic distinctiveness (aka system 
boundary) in society.” We think this is a 
good point and an example of how scientific 
perspectives are intertwined with perspec-
tives in society at large.
« 9 » King (§1) states that it is an intrigu-
ing philosophical claim that “a perspective, 
scientific or – presumably – otherwise, is 
an autopoietic system.” It is indeed an in-
triguing idea that perspectives in general 
are autopoietic, but in the article we only 
pose the more modest claim that a scientific 
perspective, such as a discipline, is an auto-
poietic system. King (§3) continues by ask-
ing what concept of autopoietic system we 
refer to in this claim. This is a very relevant 
question, to which we have a simple and a 
not so simple answer. The simple answer is 
that in making this claim we consider sci-
entific perspectives as social systems, and 
that, e.g., the differentiation of science into 
specialized disciplines supports this under-
standing of science (§17 and §12). This idea 
of disciplinary perspectives is supported by 
Szostak (§2), who states that it is central to 
the discourse in the association for Inter-
disciplinary studies and provides examples 
of the key elements of such scientific per-
spectives that are largely in accordance 
with ours.
« 10 » The not so simple but more ad-
equate answer aims at developing the plural-
istic approach to scientific perspectives that 
we indicated in our target article (§10) and 
that spurred King’s question. Even if we agree 
to regard a scientific perspective as a self-
organizing and in some sense autopoietic 
system, there are, as King (§3 and elsewhere) 
points out, at least two different understand-
ings of autopoietic systems, originating in 
Maturana & varela and in Luhmann. Mat-
urana & varela focus on organisms or living, 
cognitive systems, which reproduce their 
own constituent parts such as proteins, nu-
cleic acids, organelles, etc. Luhmann focuses 
on social, communicative systems, systems 
that consists of communication, and which 
reproduce their own communication ele-
ments, processes and structures. We have 
discussed this difference, and related ques-
tions such as different concepts of observa-
tion, elsewhere in some detail (alrøe & Noe 
2012, 2014), as noted in footnotes 5 and 6.
« 11 » overall, we employ a Luhmannian 
social systems approach to radicalize the 
existing perspectivist, cognitive approach 
to science (§10). Luhmann’s theory of au-
topoietic, communicative social systems 
forms the basis for the polyocular frame-
work that we suggest. In reply to King, we 
acknowledge the issue is more complex than 
that. But since we are dealing with scientific 
perspectives as social systems, Maturana 
& varela’s account of autopoietic systems 
is inadequate, and therefore we rely on the 
theory of social systems, which Luhmann 
and others have elaborated in great detail. 
That said, social systems theory is not the 
only perspective on science; elements of the 
systems theory of Maturana & varela (and 
other perspectives) are needed to gain a bet-
ter systems theoretical understanding of sci-
entific perspectives.
« 12 » a scientific perspective, for in-
stance a specialised discipline such as soil 
physics, can be observed as a purely com-
municative social system or as a more mate-
rial, cognitive system analogous to an organ-
ism or a living system. as a communicative 
social system, it establishes and reproduces 
its own specialised scientific concepts, se-
mantics, archetypical examples, argumenta-
tive logics, hypotheses, diagrams, models, 
theories, etc. In analogy with a living sys-
tem, the scientific perspective reproduces 
key constituent elements of the system as 
a cognitive system, such as specialised re-
searchers, observation instruments and 
methods, experimental facilities, research 
platforms, indicator systems, etc. This is of-
ten done through structural couplings with 
other systems and other scientific perspec-
tives. a very prominent example is that of 
the very large high-tech instruments for 
experiments and observation established 
by high-energy physics in CERN and else-
where. The scientific perspective also es-
tablishes and reproduces the organisational 
structures that support communication in 
the form of conferences, journals, peer re-
view systems, educations, email discussion 
lists, web pages, etc. The key point is that sci-
entific perspectives are operationally closed 
(cf. King §12); it is the perspective itself that 
determines what is, and what is not, needed 
and accepted, through a continuing process.
What is the nature of second-order 
polyocular research processes?
« 13 » How do we employ multiple per-
spectives? Here we approach the heart of 
the target article, the second-order poly-
ocular research process, and a large part of 
the questions in the commentaries. For ex-
ample, King (§2) asks: “How can polyocular 
research observe/not observe?” and (§6) 
“what it is that synthesizes first-order obser-
vations into something adequately polyocu-
lar?” We have several different, but equally 
important, answers to these and related 
questions.
« 14 » one key to understanding the 
idea of polyocular research is that there is 
no hope of a holistic perspective. The para-
dox of scientific expertise is that the growth 
of science leads to a fragmentation of sci-
ence and scientific knowledge (alrøe & Noe 
2011). This is a consequence of the func-
tional differentiation of science illuminated 
by social systems theory, which shows how 
differentiated social systems become inde-
pendent and closed to each other. Practical 
experiences from interdisciplinary work 
support this closure and lack of insight be-
tween different perspectives, as indicated 
in the target article (§4) and backed up by 
hoffmann (§§1–3), Szostak (§2), and Callebaut 
(§4); the latter two also fully agree on the 
prevalence of hegemony and lack of respect 
between the involved disciplines.
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« 15 » so how can independent and 
mutually closed perspectives cooperate on 
observing some complex phenomena or 
wicked problem? our answer is “second-
order observation.” This is not carried out 
by first-order perspectives, because these 
are all specialized in observing different as-
pects of the world and not each other (eco-
nomics, for instance, can only observe the 
observations of biology in economic terms, 
such as valuation). Nor are we thinking of 
what might be called second-order science 
in the form of sociology of science, history 
of science, philosophy of science, etc. These 
perspectives have science as their research 
object, whereas the second-order observa-
tion of polyocular research has the same 
research object as the first-order perspec-
tives involved. disciplines do not “sponta-
neously generate their own second-order 
visions when encountering domains of re-
ality currently outside their remit” as Fuller 
(§6) suggests. unlike reflexive processes in 
general, polyocular second-order observa-
tion requires a very deliberately planned 
framework. But given the right conditions, 
polyocular perspectives are indeed self-or-
ganising and autopoietic, they are not deter-
mined from without.
« 16 » There is a reason for using the 
term “polyocular” to designate this sec-
ond-order observation process, and not 
something more colloquial such as “multi-
perspectival” (cf. hoffmann §3). The anal-
ogy to binocular vision is deep, because it 
incorporates the idea of looking at some-
thing through multiple “oculars” without 
seeing directly what each ocular is seeing. 
The polyocular research process is not just 
a second-order process, it is a first-, second- 
and zeroth-order observation process (cf. 
Figure 2); it is observing a complex dynamic 
object that cannot be “observed as it is,” but 
only through the observation of different 
perspectives’ observations of it.
« 17 » The first- and second-order pro-
cesses of polyocular research are separate, 
very different, and mutually dependent. 
There cannot be a second-order polyocular 
perspective without first-order perspectives. 
and first-order perspectives cannot pro-
claim to observe complex phenomena with-
out a second-order, polyocular observation 
process that establishes that these different 
perspectives are even observing the same 
dynamical object, let alone gathering a mul-
tidimensional understanding of it.
« 18 » The gathering of aspects of this 
dynamical research object by a polyocular, 
second-order observation of the observa-
tions – or insights cf. Szostak (§4) – of a 
range of different first-order perspectives is 
thus not like the synthesis of observations 
that can be made within a single perspective. 
The second-order process must observe and 
communicate these first-order observations 
together with their perspectival context, just 
as binocular vision must operate with the 
distance between the two oculars and the 
matching of the two images to infer depth.
« 19 » Callebaut (§§8–10) objects to a 
“levels view” of science based on a natu-
ralistic account of science. This objection 
is directed against our second-order ap-
proach, but we actually agree with Callebaut 
in this. We do not consider second-order 
science of interdisciplinarity to be based on 
a transcendental theory of knowledge (sensu 
Luhmann, quoted in Callebaut §10). and we 
agree with Callebaut (§9) that: “as a matter of 
principle, any naturalistic/scientific account 
of science must be reflexive, for otherwise 
one would ‘get out of the system’.” It is im-
portant to maintain that polyocular research 
is a research process like other research pro-
cesses; it is part of science as a self-corrective 
activity (Callebaut §8) or a common learning 
process (alrøe 2000), just like any other 
kind of research proper. We think of this in 
terms of the systems theoretical insight that 
such self-correction and learning is inher-
ently a systems internal process due to the 
operational closure of scientific perspectives 
as autopoietic systems.
« 20 » somewhat in the same vein, 
hoffmann (§§5f) asks why the second-order 
science of interdisciplinary research is sup-
posed to be a “science.” second-order poly-
ocular research must always be concrete; it is 
a research process that is done in connection 
with a selection of (first-order) scientific 
perspectives. It is thus not a general institu-
tion or research community, to answer hoff-
mann’s (§5) questions; it is an approach to 
interdisciplinary research. We do not speak 
of polyocular research as “a science,” but as 
“second-order science,” that is, as a form of 
science that consists not only of first-order 
scientific observation, but of first-, second- 
and zeroth-order observation processes. The 
reason we speak not only of second-order 
research processes, but of second-order sci-
ence, is that we (in line with the special is-
sue that this article is part of) consider the 
development of methods for carrying out 
second-order processes in science – and 
the concomitant criteria for whether such 
methods are better or worse science – a very 
important development of science as such; 
equal in importance to the differentiation 
and fragmentation of science that motivates 
such second-order science.
« 21 » as an aside, Callebaut (§11) sug-
gests sticking to “multi-perspectival” and 
avoiding the term “polyocular” because it 
“perpetuates the persistent bias toward vi-
sion in our scientific and philosophical un-
derstanding of human perception.” Howev-
er, since “perspective” comes from the Latin 
verb for “to see through” or “look closely” 
(perspectiva ars was the “science of optics”), 
we are not better off using “perspective” 
rather than “ocular” in this regard. Instead, 
we suggest emphasizing the evolution of 
these concepts to cover not only other forms 
of human perception than vision, but also 
other forms of the much broader variety of 
scientific observation, which are evidently 
much broader, just as we use, for example, 
“see” and “insight” in a broader sense than 
that of vision.
What does this mean for 
understanding interdisciplinary 
work?
« 22 » turning from the theoretical to 
the more applied side of polyocular research 
as a framework for interdisciplinary work, 
we are happy to learn of the recent pub-
lication by o’Rourke et al. (2014), which, 
Szostak (§9) reports, is similar to our ap-
proach in addressing perspectival barriers to 
cross-disciplinary communication. We have 
not been able to read this publication yet, 
but according to szostak, the findings from 
the toolbox project seem to corroborate our 
own findings from projects where we have 
tried out multi-perspectival and polyocular 
methods.
« 23 » In the commentaries we received 
several questions concerning who is doing 
the second-order observing. Callebaut (§7) 
asks: “who are to be the polyocular prob-
lem solvers,” and suggests that these should 
be first and foremost the researchers them-
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selves and other involved stakeholders. King 
(§§12f) asks: “Who or what does the synthe-
sis of the multiple first-order observations,” 
and speculates that “some human agent or 
languaging capacity” may be needed. Here 
we must emphasize the distinction between 
a scientific perspective as an autopoietic, 
communicative social systems and the sci-
entists, researchers, and other stakeholders 
that may play a part in that system. strictly 
speaking, from a social systems perspective, 
humans are not part of scientific perspec-
tives (be they first-order or second-order), 
but belong to the environment of the social 
system. That said, we agree with Callebaut 
that the researchers and others involved in 
the first-order perspectives can take part in 
the second-order observation process. Re-
searchers can to some degree participate in 
more than one scientific perspective, and in-
teract (communicate) with other specialized 
perspectives, depending on their degree of 
interactional expertise (insights into other 
perspectives, see §61). But interactional ex-
pertise does not in itself constitute second-
order science (to answer the question in 
hofmann §6), though interactional expertise 
can help researchers partake in the second-
order processes of polyocular research. We 
also think there are benefits from the same 
researchers partaking in both first- and 
second-order polyocular research processes, 
in terms of avoiding new alienations, as Cal-
lebaut (§7) suggests, and in terms of bringing 
insights from first-order perspectives into 
the polyocular communication. But there 
is definitely also room for other kinds of re-
searchers to take part in polyocular research, 
such as the body of interdisciplinary schol-
ars suggested by Szostak (§12), who work 
symbiotically with disciplinary specialists 
but have quite different skills and attitudes.
« 24 » Fuller (§10) suggests that the 
state must intervene in the case of cross-
disciplinary conflicts “as a fair arbiter of 
these contesting second-order perspectival 
claims.” But this does not at all enter into our 
suggestion of a polyocular framework for 
interdisciplinary research. Fuller focuses on 
the political conditions and incentives to en-
courage or – in the case of the state – “force 
otherwise wayward disciplines to work to-
gether to address free-standing social prob-
lems” (§5). We focus on the conditions for 
interdisciplinarity within science: the para-
doxical co-occurrence of, on the one hand, 
ubiquitous and continuing calls for inter-
disciplinarity to compensate for disciplin-
ary specialization in the face of complex 
problems and, on the other hand, a general 
lack of recognition of the value of interdisci-
plinary work and lack of incentive structures 
that encourage interdisciplinary work.
« 25 » Focusing on how interdisciplin-
ary research may work, hoffmann (§10) states 
that “the crucial question is obviously […] 
how a shared, coordinated, or integrated 
perspective can be achieved.” We disagree, 
because this question throws “integrated” 
together with “shared” and “coordinated,” 
and we see those as very different. In the tar-
get article (we write with reference to alrøe 
& Noe 2011):
“ The differentiation and specialization of sci-
ence and expertise results in what we call per-
spectival knowledge asymmetries: different scien-
tific perspectives see complex matters differently, 
and these differences cannot, and should not, be 
merged.” (§12)
hoffmann (§11) writes in response to this: “If 
this is indeed true, why should we engage 
in any polyocular research project? If first-
order perspectives can never be merged, 
how should we ever be able to cope with 
wicked problems?” In a similar vein, Szostak 
(§10) states the “there seems very little about 
what I would see as the critical step of inte-
gration,” pointing to Repko (2012) for “the 
value of finding some common ground: a 
concept or conceptual map or even a theory 
that all might potentially accept” (§10).
« 26 » This question about the need for 
integration is, we believe, a key point, and 
a point that many seem reluctant to accept. 
We will therefore try to explicate it in a little 
more detail here. We think that different 
scientific perspectives can in general be co-
ordinated and that synchronization is a par-
ticular aim in polyocular research; we think 
that a shared problem is a precondition 
for polyocular research; and we think that 
shared research in form of polyocular con-
textual communication is crucial to polyoc-
ular research (§§59–65). But we think that 
the idea of finding common concepts and 
theories across very different scientific per-
spectives as a ground for interdisciplinarity 
is misguided. We are of course aware that 
integration or merging of first-order scien-
tific perspectives takes place, mostly in the 
form of related perspectives spurring a new 
intermediate perspective (e.g., molecular bi-
ology) or in relation to the development of 
new technologies, and that it may well be a 
political goal, such as the “converging tech-
nologies” agendas that Fuller (§4) refers to. 
our point is that such integrations remain 
first-order, that they therefore, in contrast 
to the aim of integration, contribute to fur-
ther differentiation of science, and that they 
therefore cannot solve the problem of solv-
ing wicked problems.
« 27 » as Szostak (§8) notes, we think 
the Kuhnian incommensurability between 
consecutive paradigms corresponds to 
problems in integrating and communicat-
ing across perspectives in interdisciplinary 
work (§75). But we find a deeper perspec-
tival source of such incommensurability 
than language barriers, residing in the dif-
ferent observational apparatuses and forms 
of interaction provided by them. In the case 
of such incommensurability, when the dif-
ference is not between rationality and non-
rationality, but between completely differ-
ent conceptions of rationality, levelling out 
the disagreement by transforming it into a 
continua, as suggested by Szostak (§11) will 
be a disservice to the effort to achieve a bet-
ter understanding. In the same way, holistic 
and hegemonic interdisciplinarity tend to 
hide incommensurability, whereas we want 
to make it visible. The contextualised obser-
vation and communication that we see as 
essential for polyocular research does not 
remove the barriers of communication be-
tween scientific perspectives, but transcends 
them (in line with Niels Bohr’s recommen-
dations in quantum physics, see §§22 and 
63).
« 28 » unlike what hoffmann (§3) states, 
we find our approach to be very far from 
the “model of planning as an argumenta-
tive process in the course of which an image 
of the problem and of the solution emerg-
es gradually among the participants, as a 
product of incessant judgment, subjected 
to critical argument” suggested by Rittel & 
Webber (1973: 162), which hoffmann (§10) 
has developed as an approach to “solving 
wicked problems by integrating a multitude 
of perspectives in practice.” We do not wish 
to claim that first-order interdisciplinarity 
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never works, but we also note that hoffmann 
works with an approach to understanding 
ill-structured problems in applied ethics 
education, which does not directly involve 
scientific perspectives, whereas our article is 
directed at actual interdisciplinary research.
« 29 » It is important to stress, however, 
that the existence, and relative importance, 
of interactional expertise (§61), local in-
tegrations in science, and the “interfield 
theories” that Callebaut (§4) refers to, does 
not contradict our claim that scientific per-
spectives cannot, and should not, in general 
be merged, and that the solution to wicked 
problems therefore relies on polyocular re-
search processes.
how may polyocular research help 
make real-world decisions?
« 30 » Szostak (§10) finds our remark 
that “any deliberate approach to instigate 
change and transformation must take place 
through an established perspective” (§66) 
rather cryptic. However, this follows directly 
from a perspectivist understanding of sci-
ence. The scientific repertoire of interaction 
with the world is perspectival: physics, ecol-
ogy, economy, sociology, and psychology all 
have different ways of interacting with the 
world in their research, and therefore their 
means of addressing a problem are differ-
ent and they point to different forms of in-
terventions to solve a problem. There is no 
escaping this; all research-based solutions 
are subject to these conditions, the differ-
ent ways to instigate change are connected 
to different scientific perspectives. Therefore 
the process of establishing a shared solu-
tion is a separate, difficult task in polyocu-
lar research, based on the multidimensional 
understanding that has been established 
(§§66f). and these perspectival conditions 
for how to instigate change are also crucial 
to understanding complex societal tasks 
such as the regulation of agroecosystems 
(Noe & alrøe 2014b).
« 31 » Szostak (§8) writes that though we, 
the authors, are thoroughly “perspectival,” 
we argue that one can “gain an ‘unambigu-
ous’ description of a ‘complex phenomenon’ 
by looking at this from multiple perspectives 
(§22).” But this is a misunderstanding; what 
we advocate is “taking a complex phenome-
non to mean a phenomenon where multiple 
perspectives are needed to give an unambig-
uous description of the phenomenon.” The 
term “unambiguous description” is from 
Niels Bohr (see §22), meaning a descrip-
tion that does not contradict itself because it 
includes the observational context, and not 
some form of objective description in a clas-
sical sense.
« 32 » In relation to this, Callebaut (§5) 
states that a first priority of scientific per-
spectivism should be the elaboration of 
a grammar of perspectives, telling us how 
scientific perspectives can (and cannot) 
be meaningfully combined; a grammar to 
which we, the authors of the target article, 
have not begun to contribute. This aim is 
certainly important, and we do in fact sug-
gest at least one element of such a grammar 
in the target article (§76); namely a typology 
of the forms of complementarity between 
scientific perspectives and their relation 
to the general conditions for observation. 
Based on such a typology, we write,
“ an analysis can be made of what role comple-
mentarity plays in cross-disciplinary research, 
how scientific disagreements may be connected 
to the complementarity of scientific perspectives, 
and what this means for the options to produce 
unambiguous descriptions of complex phenom-
ena through second-order science.” (ibid)
« 33 » Finally, hoffmann (§11) some-
what challengingly asks how the polyocular 
framework “could help make good decisions 
when facing wicked problems.” He elabo-
rates: 
“ We can talk forever about the multitude of 
perspectives that come into play when we want 
to build a highway […] But at the end of the day 
there needs to be a decision: should it be built or 
not?” (ibid)
« 34 » We agree with Szostak (§8) that 
“there is no value in interdisciplinarity un-
less it allows understandings that are in 
some way superior,” and that we therefore 
need to answer hoffmann’s question. How-
ever, Szostak (§8) continues that “we can-
not speak of scientific progress unless we 
can understand each other well enough to 
recognize progress collectively.” and in this 
lies the seed to a reply. hoffmann’s question 
is posed in a frame that goes beyond the 
frame of research. The decision to build or 
not build the highway is a political decision, 
not a scientific one. The role of science is to 
provide the best possible basis for the politi-
cal decision. and here we think polyocular 
research is better, because the alternatives 
are worse: advice from a range of dispa-
rate and blindly disagreeing experts, advice 
based on interdisciplinary research biased 
by the hegemony of a single discipline, self-
proclaimed “holistic” advice that is blind to 
what this particular perspective is not able to 
observe, etc. There is a need for interdiscipli-
narity to address wicked problems, and the 
polyocular framework is, we believe, a way 
towards better interdisciplinary research.
Conclusion
« 35 » There is a large and continuing in-
crease in complexity in society. science is it-
self part of this complexity increase through 
the involvement of science in the develop-
ment of new technologies and new ways 
of looking at the world. But science is also 
a means for society to handle the (wicked) 
problems that the growing complexity gives 
rise to. second-order science, as we see it, is 
a different way to handle complexity. Instead 
of trying to reduce complexity in the form 
of new universal approaches that rely on the 
continuing growth in computing power, the 
polyocular approach aims to work with con-
crete problematics in the form of new arenas 
for handling observations: arenas that are 
based on second-order observation of the 
insights of first-order scientific perspectives. 
Polyocular research is thus an example of 
a new form of science, a second-order sci-
ence that incorporates both first-order and 
second-order research processes.
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oF RELATED INTEREST A FORAy IntO the WORldS OF AnIMAlS And huMAnS
In this book published in 1934 as Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen and 1940 
as Bedeutungslehre, the pioneering biophilosopher Jakob von Uexküll embarked on a remarkable 
exploration of the unique social and physical environments that individual animal species, as well as 
individuals within species, build and inhabit. Uexküll’s concept of the umwelt holds new possibilities 
for the terms of animality, life, and the framework of biopolitics. The influential work of speculative 
biology is available again in a new English translation.  
A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans with A Theory of Meaning by 
Jakob von Uexküll, translated by Joseph D. o’Neil. University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis MN, 2010. ISBN 978-0-8166-5900-5, 280 pages.
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